I picked 3 months as an example. We can debate what constitutes a reasonable period. You must misunderstand what I mean by implied consent. I do not believe that having sex, whether unprotected or protected is enough to imply consent. Given that preganancy is only one possible outcome of sex, it seems reasonable that you cannot infer intent to consent to pregnancy from simply participation in sex. The only ones who maintain that participation in sex is enough to imply consent are zealots such as Mr Canada and they do it without any support of legal precedence.
The only way to settle this issue, and other bordering issues such as embryonic stem cell research, is to define more clearly when human life begins. If it's considered a human life, then its right to live can outweigh other considerations, such as the privacy rights of the pregnant woman who is hosting a growing embryo or fetus.
Even if you assume participation in sex implies consent, there is no reason why such consent is irrevokable. So the question is what would a reasonable person interpret as a woman's consent to carry a pregnancy to term? IMV, a clear set of rules that define that the lack of abortion after a specfic period, constitutes irrevokable consent to carry the pregnancy to term.
And the only reasonable reasons to set a "specific period" is because it has become a determining factor for considering it to be a human life with guarantees of rights and protection from harm.
Yes I agree with this, however there is a margin of error. Some of of the earliest babies which have survived have been less than 22 weeks.
Yes, and that's because not every baby developes at the same rate. This is why using a set number of weeks is not as good a guideline as using fetal viability as the standard. A fetus can be as old as 28 weeks and still not be ready to survive outside of the mother's womb. http://en.wikipedia....ation_in_growth
Because one of the principles we hold to in society, and I agree with is the notiion of one's right to oneself.
And, you are certainly not yourself after you're dead and buried.
In death that determination of what to do with one's body falls to the person one designates (ie one's family). The state should not have the right to intefere in removing choice in what to do with oneself regardless if one is dead or alive.
What if it's in the interests of society as a whole (especially one with a desperate shortage of available organs) to have all available organs for donation? What is the interests of the family who want to deny any option to use one of the deceased's organs to save another life?