Defence

Major General MacKenzie Interview on the Canadian Military and War on Terror

Greg Farries — Thu, 03 Apr 2008 10:24:54 -0600

My interview with retired Major General, Lewis MacKenzie has finally been posted. The General had a number of interesting things to say relating to Canada’s Armed Forces, the War on Terror and Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.

Here are some of the points I found the most interesting:

On the tension between General Hillier and former Defense Minister O’Connor

[…]O’Connor and Hillier got along extremely well. The tension between the two was a myth. Mind you, the myth was exasperated by the [Prime Minister’s Office] floating trial balloons about firing Hillier – to see what the public reaction would be if Hillier was in fact fired. However, the public reaction was very supportive of Hillier.

On the size of the Canadian Armed Forces:

Well, when you’re talking about a military – an Army in particular, which I’m more familiar with – that you can march into the Maple Leaf Gardens and tell it to sit down and there are still 3,000 empty seats. You’re talking about an infantry that is 2,000 smaller than the Toronto Police Services. You’re talking about a minuscule military that requires vision as to how it’s going to be deployed.

On peacekeeping:

I’m the guy who has the presentation called, ‘The Peacekeeping Myth.’ Peacekeeping was never really a priority during the time, post-Pearson, when we had maybe 2,000 troops, at any one time, for over 30 years, outside the country conducting peacekeeping missions. We had 15,000 stationed in the central front in Europe, Air Force, Army, armed with nuclear weapons – CF104 and the Honest John missile systems. And we had our Navy, at sea, as part of the North Atlantic Fleet. So that was our number one priority – foreign policy priority – by far. Peacekeeping was way down, maybe fourth of fifth on the list of priorities. But successive governments, of both political stripes, kept pushing this myth because it’s cheap. You don’t need a lot of kit, you just need a blue beret and a pistol and get international credit for it. So, what is happening in Afghanistan is not peacekeeping, its counter insurgency.

On the conflict in Darfur:

The world should just bow its head in shame, but it’s happening because of the rigor mortis in the decision-making process of the [UN] Security Council. You could put a military force together and go in and put the rout on the Janjaweed, the militia, and on the rebels who started this fight. We could put the boots to all of them, but it’s not going to happen. [But] it should happen, because now hundreds of thousands of people have been either pushed over the border into camps in Chad or have been killed.

This is just a small sampling of what General Mackenzie shared. Make sure to head over and read the full interview.

Good Reading - The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar

Harold Jansen — Fri, 21 Dec 2007 09:50:08 -0700

I just finished reading The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar by Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang (published by Penguin Canada) and I'd highly recommend it to anyone looking to better understand what Canada is up to in Afghanistan. This book isn't really about Afghanistan, it's about Canada's decision making and institutional structures and it points to some real problems. The book shows how government departments (Defence, Foreign Affairs, CIDA) have so far been unable to meet the challenge of working together, which is essential in the new security environment. It shows how the institutional weakness of the Foreign Affairs department has meant that Defence has been driving much of Canada's foreign policy towards Afghanistan.

Most interesting of all, though, are the accounts of the relationship between Canada and the United States. Besides recounting the series of decisions that led Canada to Kandahar, the book also talks about Canada's decisions not to participate in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and the war in Iraq. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the book documents how American political leaders such as Donald Rumsfeld respected and understood Canada's decision. In the case of BMD, they were frustrated with Canada's dithering on the issue, not the eventual decision.

The book is built up interviews, particularly with former Liberal cabinet ministers and even former Prime Minister Paul Martin. As a result, we get a fascinating glimpse into the discussions and inter-departmental rivalries that shape the real world of policy-making. The book is therefore very accessible: it's an interesting narrative, not a dry academic treatment. Another strength of the book is its balance. This is a balanced and fair treatment of the book. The final chapter discusses different options for Canada in Kandahar. There is no neat solution. Anything we do -- from staying to cutting our losses and leaving -- has tremendous costs both to Afghanistan and to Canada's ability to be effective in the new world.

What struck me most about this book is how low a priority Afghanistan was for our political leaders and how it has become the major foreign policy question for our country. This is an important debate for Canadians to understand; Stein and Lang have done Canada a service by helping us understand how we got here and what's at stake.

President Bush Forces Missile Defence on Prime Minister Martin

Greg Farries — Wed, 26 Jan 2005 00:00:00 -0700

Paul Martin and Ballistic Missile Defence

Greg Farries — Wed, 01 Dec 2004 00:00:00 -0700

Paul Martin and His Commitment to Missile Defence

Greg Farries — Sun, 04 Jul 2004 00:00:00 -0600

To Many National Priorities in Canada

Greg Farries — Tue, 29 Oct 2002 00:00:00 -0700