Minority Government

The Liberal - NDP Coalition and Forming Government

Jay Makarenko — Fri, 19 Dec 2008 08:27:03 -0700

Even though the Liberal Party of Canada and the New Democratic Party have agreed, if necessary, to form a coalition government, a number of events must occur for such a scenario to become reality. The following feature provides an overview of how it is possible for a proposed Liberal-NDP coalition government to assume power according to Canada’s parliamentary tradition, even without an election. It also includes a discussion of the particular steps that must be taken for such a change in government to occur, including: the introduction of a vote of non-confidence against the Conservative minority government; a request by the Governor General of the leader of the Liberal Party to form a new government; and the immediate tasks facing a possible coalition government once in power.

Responsible Government and Canada’s Parliament

Under the proposed coalition government, the Liberals, New Democrats, and Bloc Québécois agreed to defeat to the Conservative minority government and replace it with a Liberal-NDP coalition. How can a change in government without an election be considered democratic?

For more information on minority and coalition governments in Canada:

The answer lies in Canada’s parliamentary system and its particular structure of responsible government. For many people, the term “responsible government” means that government should be directly chosen by and accountable to the people. In some democracies in the world, this is precisely the case. In the United States, for example, voters directly elect their local representatives (Members of Congress and Senators), as well as their political executive (the President).

In Canada, and most other parliamentary democracies in the world, the notion of responsible government means something quite different: government is not directly responsible to the average citizen, but to their elected representatives (called Members of Parliament or MPs). Under this system, Canadians directly choose their MPs, who, in turn, are responsible for selecting and holding accountable the government (in this context, the “government” refers to the Prime Minister and Cabinet). In modern Canadian politics, this is generally decided along political party lines, with the party that has the greatest number of MPs forming the government and its leader becoming the Prime Minister.

It is at this point that a second element of responsible government is critical, specifically, the requirement that the government must maintain the “confidence” of the House of Commons to remain in power. In order for the government to govern, it must maintain majority support among all MPs. If it cannot do so, then the government falls (or is “defeated”) and must be replaced. It is in this way that democratic accountability is maintained in the Canadian parliamentary system. If a government acts in a manner that loses the support of a majority of representatives — representatives who have been elected by the citizens of Canada — then said government no longer has the legitimacy to rule and must step aside.

Normally, the defeat of a government due to lack of confidence triggers a general election. Citizens are given an opportunity to have their say, and they may choose to return their elected representatives to the House of Commons or select new representatives if they are dissatisfied with their past conduct. The Canadian Constitution, however, does allow for another option. The Governor General of Canada has the power to ask the leader of another political party to form a government, without holding a general election. This may be done in situations where another leader has the ability to gain the majority support of all Members of Parliament.

Some might criticize such a situation as “undemocratic,” and they would be correct if one considers democracy to require governments to be directly chosen by and responsible to average citizens. If, however, one accepts the definition of democracy as it is understood in Canada’s parliamentary tradition, then the claim of being “undemocratic” is far from clear. Democratic legitimacy, at least in this context, simply depends on whether Canadians have had an opportunity to choose their elected representatives, and whether the government enjoys the confidence of those representatives.

Vote of Non-confidence in Conservative Government

As discussed above, Canada’s parliamentary system allows the opposition parties to defeat the government and form a coalition government. This, however, raises an important question: what must take place in order for the proposed Liberal-NDP coalition to become the government?

Three steps are important in this context: 1) the defeat of the Conservative government through a vote of non-confidence; 2) a request by the Governor General of the leader of the Liberal Party (the party with the second greatest number of seats in the House of Commons) to form a new government; and 3) the filling of actual Cabinet positions by the new government. The subsequent sections examine each of these steps in detail.

Before the Liberals and New Democrats could assume the reins of power, they must first defeat the Conservative minority government. This is accomplished by casting a vote of non-confidence in the government, which may be performed in a number of ways. The opposition parties may, for example, defeat an important piece of government legislation, such as a money bill (a budget, for example) or throne speech (which outlines the government’s planned agenda). Another option is for the opposition parties to introduce and pass a motion explicitly declaring they no longer have confidence in the government (a “motion” is a formal proposal by a member of the House to take certain action).

It is important to note that the Liberals and New Democrats could not perform a vote of non-confidence without the support of a majority of MPs in the House of Commons. In this case, the Liberals and New Democrats do not have sufficient combined numbers to pass such a vote. As such, the third opposition party in the House, the Bloc Québécois, would also have to support such a vote of non-confidence — something the Party has publicly pledged to do.

Initially, the three opposition parties had stated they would vote against the Conservative government’s November economic and fiscal update. This update is considered a money bill, as it contained initiatives regarding government revenues and expenditures. Its defeat in the House, therefore, would have been considered a vote of non-confidence and thus would have triggered the defeat of the government. The opposition parties, however, were denied an opportunity to exercise a vote of non-confidence when the Conservative government first delayed the vote, and then prorogued (or “temporarily suspended”) Parliament until late-January 2009. Upon the reopening of Parliament, the Conservative government is committed to introducing both a throne speech and an early budget. Defeat of either of these pieces of legislation will represent a vote of non-confidence and the defeat of the government.

As of December 15, 2008, it is unclear whether this vote of non-confidence will take place. The New Democrats and the Bloc Québécois have publicly stated they will vote against the government regardless of any changes in its policies. The Liberal Party, under new interim leader Michael Ignatieff, has taken a somewhat different position. If the Conservatives are willing to work with the Liberal Party and adopt key Liberal economic policies, such as an aggressive economic stimulus package, then the Liberals have suggested they might be open to supporting the government’s January budget. If, however, the Conservatives fail to cooperate with the Liberal Party, then the Liberals have indicated they are prepared to defeat the government and form a coalition government with the New Democrats. Hence, much depends on whether the two major parties, the Conservatives and Liberals, are able to cooperate.

Governor General and a Coalition Government

Even if the opposition parties defeat the Conservatives through a vote of non-confidence, this does not assure a Liberal-NDP coalition government.

Should it be defeated in the House, custom would dictate the Prime Minister (in this case, Conservative leader Stephen Harper) should resign and offer advice to the Governor General of Canada as to what should occur next. In most cases, a defeated government will advise the Governor General to dissolve Parliament and call a general election. This is likely what the Conservative government would do, as it would view another election, with the possibility of forming a majority government, as preferable to being relegated to opposition party status. It is, however, open to the Governor General to disregard the advice of the Conservative government and, instead, ask the leader of the next largest political party, in this case the Liberal Party of Canada, to form a new government. As such, Parliament would not be dissolved, no election would be held, and the Liberals and New Democrats would be given an opportunity to form a coalition government.

As of December 15, 2008, it is far from clear what the Governor General would decide under such circumstances. This is due, in large part, to conflicting constitutional traditions. On the one hand, there is the tradition that the Governor General, as a purely ceremonial figurehead, should always adopt the advice of the democratically elected government. According to this view, the Governor General would accept the Conservative government’s advice to dissolve Parliament and call a general election. The likelihood of this outcome is bolstered by the fact the Governor General accepted the Conservative government’s advice to prorogue Parliament in early December, even though the practice was deemed by many to be completely inappropriate at the time. (A prorogation is a mechanism traditionally used to suspend Parliament towards the end of a session, after the House has completed its work. It is not customarily used, as occurred in this case, at the beginning of a session, before the House had even begun its work, and solely to protect the government from being defeated in a vote of non-confidence).

Despite tradition, precedence exists for the Governor General to disregard the government’s advice and ask an opposition party to form a new government. Although it has been well over half a century, a similar situation occurred in 1926, when Governor General Lord Byng refused then-Liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s advice to dissolve government, instead asking the Conservative Party to form a new government. Back to the current context, it would seem there are a number of factors that could tempt the Governor General not to dissolve Parliament. The first is the presence of a viable alternative government, in the form the Liberal-NDP coalition — a coalition which has been formally and publicly established by the parties through the signing of key documents (see below for more information). The second is the fact that a federal election was held as recently as October 2008, which may persuade the Governor General to give the current Parliament a second chance under a new government rather than calling another election only months after the previous one.

The Coalition and Forming Government

If the opposition parties defeat the Conservative government and the Governor General asks the leader of the Liberal Party to form a new government, the proposed Liberal-NDP coalition would then be required to deal with a number of immediate issues.

The first of these would be the make-up of the new coalition government. The coalition agreement, signed by the Liberals and NDP in early December, establishes a number of general rules regarding the composition of a coalition Cabinet. This includes the number of ministers to be included in the Cabinet (24), how many ministries each party would receive (18 for the Liberals and 6 for the NDP), and the granting to the Liberal Party of the two most important Cabinet positions — those of the Prime Minster and the Minister of Finance. Nevertheless, the new coalition government would have to deal with the difficult issue of who precisely would fill individual cabinet positions, and other senior public service staff (such as deputy ministers) positions — a task that could prove challenging for a coalition based on membership of two political parties with differing ideologies.

A second key issue will be setting up mechanisms for cooperation between the two coalition partners, the Liberals and New Democrats, as well as between the coalition government and its key supporter in the opposition ranks, the Bloc Québécois. To this end, the coalition agreement does provide some general principles on how this cooperation will take place. For example, it provides that the Liberal Prime Minister would consult with the leader of the NDP on key appointments, and that the caucuses of the two parties would deliberate together on “joint issues.” Moreover, the agreements call for the implementation of a consultation process with the Bloc Québécois. That said, many of the details around this cooperation will have to be worked out by the coalition government if it is to maintain unity over the long run.

Third, a possible coalition would have to work out its policy priorities and strategies. Again, the coalition agreement provides a general policy framework for the coalition government. This includes a focus on the economy, with economic stimulus package and reforms to aid those most affected by the deteriorating economy. Nevertheless, the coalition partners, and the Bloc, would have to work out the specifics around these economic initiatives, while compromising on other policy decisions that could arise over the lifespan of a possible coalition government.

In sum, a possible Liberal-NDP coalition faces a number of challenges before and once it comes to power. These range from first defeating the Conservative government, to being requested by the Governor General to form a government, to implementing and maintaining a cooperative and productive relationship between the coalition partners (the Liberals and NDP), as well as with the Bloc Québécois.

Events Leading to the Liberal - NDP Coalition Agreement

Jay Makarenko — Thu, 18 Dec 2008 15:47:59 -0700

On December 1, 2008, the Liberal Party of Canada, the New Democratic Party and the Bloc Québécois officially signed an agreement to defeat the Conservative minority government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Under this agreement, the Liberals and NDP agreed to form a coalition government, which would be supported by the Bloc. What led to the signing of this coalition accord? The following article provides an overview of factors and events surrounding the signing of this agreement, including the broader political and economic context, the coalition partners’ rejection of the Conservative economic and fiscal update, the negotiation of the agreement, and the Conservative response to the coalition threat, including its decision to seek a prorogation (or “temporary suspension”) of Parliament from Canada’s Governor General until January 2009.

Coalition in the Broader Political and Economic Context

It is important to note the broader political and economic situation in Canada leading up to the signing of this out-of-the-ordinary agreement.

Since 2004, the federal parliament has been in a perpetual state of minority governments, an interesting paradox in Canadian politics. Minority governments tend not to be viewed as positive or good for the long term — particularly from the perspective of Canada’s major political parties, which tend to look beyond minority governments to winning majorities and defeating governments. This tendency lends itself to a very hostile situation in Parliament, in which political parties view one another not as partners for cooperative governance, but as staunch competitors for political power that will attempt to create and exploit weaknesses in their opponents in order to win the ultimate prize of majority government.

Writing in mid-December 2008, it’s fair to say that concern over the Canadian and global economies increased considerably beginning in September 2008 — both with Canada’s leadership, and abroad. Of considerable worry has been the unfolding economic downturn in the United States, Canada’s largest trading partner, which officially entered into a recession, and the potential impact of said developments on the manufacturing sectors of central Canada and resource sectors in Western Canada. This, in turn, has made the economy a central issue in Canadian politics, and a key area of government public policy.

The Conservative Government’s November Economic Update

Within these broader political and economic contexts, the catalyst for the coalition agreement was the Conservative minority government’s economic and fiscal update, which it released on November 27, 2008. Titled Protecting Canada’s Future, the update outlined the Conservative government’s short-term strategy for dealing with the economic slowdown and projected drops in government revenue.

Within the economic and fiscal update, three policy initiatives, in particular, were deemed unacceptable by the opposition parties. First, the Conservative government elected not to introduce any new spending measures to stimulate the economy, choosing instead to rely on past tax reductions and infrastructure spending programs. Citing the soundness of Canada’s financial institutions and the relatively strong financial positions of Canadian households, corporations, and governments, the Conservative government argued these tenets of Canada’s economy were sufficient to ensure the economy remained stable. The Liberals, New Democrats, and Bloc Québécois rejected this premise, arguing the Conservatives had failed to appreciate the severity of the economic slowdown. Moreover, they asserted the federal government should implement an aggressive economic stimulus package, which would include broad new spending measures to encourage employment and economic activity.

Second, the Conservative government announced it would legislate a ban on strikes by public service employees until 2010-11. The government argued this measure was necessary to ensure the financial health of the federal government, as it would control labour costs during the projected period of reduced government revenues. The initiative, however, was strongly opposed by the New Democratic Party, a strong supporter of worker rights, and a party with strong ties to Canadian unions and labour organizations.

Third, the Conservative government announced it would eliminate public financing for federal political parties. Canada’s current election financing laws severely restrict donations to political parties from certain interest groups, such as big business and labour, with the purpose of limiting the influence of these groups on political parties. Since they were implemented in 2002-03, these restrictions have had the greatest impact on the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party, whose traditional sources of revenue were large donations from big business and unions respectively. The Conservative Party, by contrast, receives the bulk of its financing in the form of small donations from individuals, leaving it less affected by the restrictions. To compensate for the loss of revenue, however, federal law allows political parties to access public funds in support of their election activities. These public funds represent a large portion of New Democratic Party and the Bloc Québécois’ revenues (and to a lesser extent, those for the Liberal Party).

The Conservative government argued the elimination of public funding to political parties was necessary for the financial health of the federal government, as it would save approximately $30 million. Moreover, the government argued that such a course of action would be of symbolical importance, as political parties would be “tightening their belts” in difficult economic times. The opposition parties, by contrast, asserted the measure was an attack on Canadian democracy. The elimination of public funding, it was argued, would financially cripple the opposition parties, while leaving the Conservative Party relatively unscathed. Considering the importance of money in running effective campaigns during elections, the opposition parties argued that this would have given the Conservatives an unfair advantage in the next federal election.

Negotiating the Liberal-NDP Coalition Agreement

Immediately following the release of Conservative government’s economic and fiscal update, the Liberals, New Democrats, and Bloc Québécois publicly denounced the government’s proposals, focusing on the three policies discussed above. The New Democrats and the Bloc, moreover, indicated they would vote against the government’s update when it was introduced in the House of Commons.

Under Canada’s parliamentary system, defeat of a government money bill, such as the economic and fiscal update, would result in the fall of the government. Normally, this would lead to the calling of an election. However, Canada’s parliamentary system does allow the Governor General of Canada to ask another political party to form a government. In anticipation of this possibility, the three major opposition parties, the Liberals, NDP and Bloc, began negotiating to form a coalition government to replace the Conservatives.

While the precise nature of these negotiations has remained private, it is suspected that negotiations first began between the leaders of the New Democratic Party and the Bloc Québécois, and focused on the issue of whether the Bloc would support a possible Liberal-New Democratic coalition. As a Quebec-based party driven by the goal of achieving sovereignty for the province, it was agreed that the Bloc would not sit in any future coalition government. The party’s support, however, would be necessary to ensure the coalition could maintain the confidence of the House of Commons. On November 28, 2008, the Liberal and New Democratic parties entered into formal negotiations on a coalition agreement. These negotiations were originally conducted by former party leaders Jean Chrétien (Liberal) and Ed Broadbent (New Democrat), and were eventually extended to include the existing party leadership at the time, Liberal leader Stéphane Dion and NDP leader Jack Layton.

Key issues in the negotiations included the question of who would become prime minister; how key cabinet positions would be divided between the Liberals and NDP; particular policies a potential coalition government would pursue; and how long all three parties were prepared to support such an arrangement.

On December 1, 2008, the Liberals, the NDP and the Bloc formally announced the signing of two coalition agreements. They submitted a letter to the Governor General of Canada, asking her to consider the coalition as an alternative to calling an election if the Conservative government was defeated. The coalition partners further announced their intention to introduce a vote of non-confidence in the House in order to trigger the fall of the Harper Conservative minority government.

For more information on the structure of the proposed coalition government:

Mapleleafweb: Overview of the Liberal-NDP Coalition Agreement

Conservative Responses to the Coalition Agreement

Between November 28 and December 1, the Conservative government significantly altered its position, as first established in its November economic and fiscal update. It dropped the proposed elimination of public funding of political parties, as well as the ban on striking by public servants. Moreover, it indicated that it might be open to implementing an aggressive economic stimulus package to address the concerns of the opposition parties regarding Canada’s economic fortunes.

Even with these concessions, the coalition partners (at least initially) remained committed to defeating the Conservatives and forming a new government. In justifying their position, the coalition partners stressed their general lack of confidence in the Conservatives as a governing party and the need for a change in government in order to bring decisive action on the economy. The Conservatives, in turn, charged the coalition partners with using the economic difficulties as a smokescreen for a bid to take power.

The Conservative government’s economic and fiscal update was to be put to a vote in the House of Commons on December 1, 2008, at which point the coalition partners could — and indicated they would — have defeated the legislation and caused the fall of the government. The Conservatives, however, decided to delay the vote by a week, until December 8.

Over the course of the week, both the Conservatives and the coalition partners engaged in broad media campaigns in an attempt to gain the support of Canadians. The Conservatives worked to undercut the legitimacy of a possible coalition government, emphasizing its dependence on the Bloc Québécois (a Quebec sovereignist party), and arguing that stability, as opposed to a change in government, was vital to Canada at a time of economic crisis. The coalition partners, by contrast, pointed out that the Conservatives had struck an agreement with the Bloc in 2004 to form a coalition government if the Liberal minority government at that time was defeated. Moreover, the coalition continued to publicly question the Conservatives economic leadership, pointing to the fact the party had changed its economic policies radically in less than a week, and did not seem to have any definitive direction as far as guiding Canada through its economic difficulties.

With the coalition holding together and poised to defeat the government, on December 5, 2008, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper took the extra-ordinary step of asking the Governor General to prorogue Parliament. To “prorogue” Parliament is to discontinue a session of Parliament, and is a mechanism that has traditionally been used to end a session after Parliament has completed all its work. In this case, however, Prime Minister Harper employed such a measure at the beginning of a session, largely before Parliament had even begun its work, and, arguably, for the implicit purpose of temporarily denying the coalition partners an opportunity to defeat the government. The Conservatives asserted that proroguing Parliament was necessary in order to give Members of Parliament a pause to calmly review recent events. The coalition partners, by contrast, contended the Conservatives were circumventing the democratic process by denying the right of Members of Parliament to defeat the government.

In the end, the Governor General accepted Prime Minister Harper’s advice, that proroguing Parliament was indeed a necessary course of action to take, and officially discontinued the session of Parliament. As such, Parliament will resume sitting on January 26, 2009, with the Conservative government set to table a budget in the House of Commons on January 27. Upon resumption of Parliament and the tabling of the budget, the coalition partners will have a new opportunity to defeat the Conservatives and possibly form a new government.

For more information on the how the coalition can form a new government:

Mapleleafweb: The Liberal-NDP Coalition and Forming Government

The mess in Ottawa is an opportunity for the Greens, but....

Harold Jansen — Wed, 03 Dec 2008 14:18:12 -0700

I think it's safe to say that none of Canada's four political parties in Canada are looking especially good right now: the partisan bickering and yelling, the political manouevering and scheming, the constitutional brinkmanship. There are lots of Conservatives upset with Stephen Harper, many Liberals disgusted with Stephane Dion, and even more Canadians just annoyed with everyone.

This is a potential gold mine for the Green Party. They're not there. In the next election, they have an opportunity to make the case for change. If this is the way these four parties behave, they can say, why not bring someone in who is a real break with the past? Unfortunately for the party, Elizabeth May has cuddled up with the coalition. It's a bit surprising, really. Although the coalition may advance some environmental policies the Green Party would like, the Greens as a party don't benefit from the coalition, so some distance might position the party better. Furthermore, as Canadian politics polarizes between the coalition and the Conservatives, the Greens could find themselves squeezed. And if there is any truth to the (as of now ubsubstantiated) rumours that Elizabeth May would accept a Senate post so that she can serve in the coalition cabinet, any reasonable claim to be a party of change would be lost.

The Greens often face a tension between achieving policy goals and advancing their goals as a party. It seems to me that Elizabeth May's instincts are to take the former over the latter. Her response to the coalition seems to be more evidence of this.

If the governor-general agrees to dissolve Parliament, what would the election look like?

Harold Jansen — Tue, 02 Dec 2008 12:40:57 -0700

Running through all the what-if scenarios that could unfold over the next few weeks has become a favorite activity for Canadian junkies. Here's one that just occurred to me. What happens in the (unlikely, according to constitutional experts) event that Michaelle Jean granted a request by Stephen Harper for a dissolution of Parliament? We'd have an election. And here's where things would get even more interesting.

The Conservatives would run the full slate of candidates (with the possible exception of not running against Andre Arthur) and I'd expect the Bloc to run its 75 candidates as well. But what would the Liberals and NDP do? Would they run against each other? The danger in doing so is that they would risk splitting non-Conservative votes and possibly help facilitate a Conservative majority. It would be hard to run against each other since they now apparently have so much common ground. I could see them not running against each other's incumbents, but how would you divide up the other districts?

Even if the coalition government goes through, the question of how this would affect electoral competition is one the two parties would have to confront at some point. Most countries with coalition governments have proportional representation electoral systems, where the parties can safely run against each other because there isn't much fear of vote-splitting being an issue. But in a single-member plurality system, this is a big issue and could presumably lead to some kind of non-competition agreement. Ironically, though, this would reduce the absolute number of votes for both the Liberals and the NDP which, as we all know, are worth $1.95 per year.

The more you think about this, the more you realize it really is uncharted territory.

Note to coalition: Just because you CAN replace the government doesn't mean you SHOULD replace the government

Harold Jansen — Mon, 01 Dec 2008 18:33:02 -0700

Wow: events on Parliament Hill are developing quickly as Canada enters almost uncharted waters: the Liberals, NDP, and the Bloc have signed a deal on a proposed coalition. Given how coalition governments are foreign to Canadian political tradition, it's a remarkable thing to see this come about in such short order. I'm surprised to see this. I knew the opposition parties would be galvanized by the end of the vote subsidy, but I thought once the Conservatives withdrew it, they would relent. I was wrong. The Conservative move started a series of events in motion that have created a momentum of its own.

As I argued yesterday, I don't see anything constitutionally improper about the Governor-General asking M. Dion to form a government if the Conservatives are defeated on a non-confidence motion in the House. It's well within her rights to do so. (Incidentally, Roger Gibbins suggests an interesting third option to Michaelle Jean: say no to both an election and to the new coalition).

Now that the move is both politically and constitutionally possible, it's time for the parties involved to take a deep breath and ask if this is really something they want to do. There's a significant downside for both the Liberals and the NDP. For the Liberals, the problem is that their leader is someone who was repudiated by voters and who enjoys little support in his caucus. The internal leadership politics of the party are going to complicate matters tremendously. Will a coalition survive the ascendacy of Michael Ignatieff (or, less likely, Bob Rae) to the Prime Ministership? The Liberals will likely once again get consumed with government and neglect the badly-needed task of party renewal. Although the NDP gets to have federal cabinet posts, something that's never happened before, there's a downside to this. As my colleague, Peter McCormick, reminded me, the record of what happens to an NDP government when propping up a Liberal goverment is not encouraging: usually, they get wiped out. A lot has made of the 1985 Ontario example where a Liberal minority displaced a Conservative minority because it had the support of the NDP. The NDP should fast forward two years to 1987 when David Peterson and the Liberals slaughtered both the NDP and the Conservatives. Look at 1974 federally: the same thing happened. Historically, Liberal-NDP deals haven't worked out well for the NDP.

Finally, the optics of this are terrible. Whatever might be said about the constitutional propriety of what they're doing, most Canadians don't understand the political nuances of constitutional monarchy and the Parliamentary system. This will look bad. What will be particularly appalling to many is that the Liberals and NDP are going to need the BQ's support to stay in power. It's not hard to see what the Conservatives will say: the Liberals' lust for power is so great they'll streak a Faustian bargain with the Bloc to regain power.

My recommendation is for the Liberals and NDP to back away slowly. Reach out to the Conservatives and get a compromise on the economic plan. Find something you can all live with. The events of the last few days have established an alternative to the Conservatives that can force the government to live up to the short-lived promise of civility and respect in the House. For the last two years, the Conservatives have had an effective majority; they now have been reduced a minority government in practice as well and have to work with the opposition. That's a huge gain for the opposition and a reassertion of Parliament's authority. Be happy with that and let's get on with things.

2008 Canadian Federal Election: Results and Summary

Jay Makarenko — Tue, 21 Oct 2008 08:04:39 -0600

On October 14, 2008, Canadians returned Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party of Canada to a second minority government. On the one hand, the 2008 election did little to change the Canadian political landscape, as the major political parties were returned to Parliament with similar seat totals and percentages of the national vote as in the previous 2006 election. On the other hand, the election saw several significant trends, such as a strengthening of the Conservative vote in Ontario, an overall decline in support for the Liberal Party, and key electoral gains for the New Democratic Party. This article provides a summary of the 2008 federal election, including an overview of the results, discussions of key factors/non-factors in the election, and an examination of the election’s impact.

2008 Federal Election Results

Second Conservative Minority Government

The 2008 federal election resulted in a second minority government for Prime Minister Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party of Canada, which won 143 of 308 seats in the House of Commons. This represented an increase in seats for the Conservatives, which garnered 124 seats in the 2006 election. Nevertheless, the Conservatives fell short of the 155 they needed to form a majority government.

The Liberal Party of Canada formed the Official Opposition, winning 76 seats in the House, the second highest seat tally of the remaining political parties. The Bloc Québécois won 50 seats (third highest total) and the New Democratic Party of Canada took 37 seats.

The 2008 general election also saw two independent MPs elected to the House of Commons. Independents are elected Members of Parliament who have no formal party affiliation. Bill Casey was elected for the Nova Scotia riding of Cumberland―Colchester―Musquodoboit Valley. Casey, originally a Conservative MP, was dismissed from that party’s caucus after he voted against the government’s budget in 2007. André Arthur, the second independent, was elected in the Quebec City-area riding of Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier. Arthur was first elected as an independent in the 2006 federal election; he has never had any affiliation with a federal political party.

2008 Election Results (Seat totals and Status by Party)

Party	2008 Election	Status	2006 Election	Seat Change
Conservative Party	143 seats	Minority Government	124 seats	+ 19
Liberal Party	76 seats	Official Opposition	103 seats	- 27
Bloc Québécois	50 seats	Opposition Party	51 seats	- 01
New Democratic Party	37 seats	Opposition Party	29 seats	+ 8
Independent	02 seats	-	01 seat	+ 01

Summary of National Vote

In terms of gains, the Green Party of Canada received the largest increase in national support of all the political parties. In 2006, the Greens won 4.5 percent of the national vote; in 2008, that total increased to 6.8 percent, a gain of 2.3 percentage points. This increase in support did not, however, translate into any seats in the House of Commons for the party.

In the 2008 vote, national support for the Conservative Party remained largely the same. In 2006, the Party received 36.27 percent of the national popular vote; in 2008, it received 37.63 percent ― an increase of 1.36 percentage points. This marginal increase, coupled with declines in Liberal Party support (see below), did result in significant increases in the party’s total seat count, as it won 19 more seats than in 2006.

Support for the New Democratic Party also remained almost the same. The party received 17.48 percent of the national popular vote in 2006. In the 2008 election, it increased its percent of the vote to 18.2 ― a gain of 0.72 percentage points. As with the Conservative Party, this small increase resulted in a significant gain in seat totals for the party; in 2008, the NDP won eight additional seats.

The Bloc Québécois incurred only a slight drop in its support. In 2006, the Bloc won 10.48 percent of the popular vote (all from the province of Quebec). In 2008 that support dropped by half a percentage point, to 9.97 percent of the vote. This, in turn, resulted in almost the same number of seats from the prevision election (51 in 2006 and 50 in 2008).

The Liberal Party experienced the largest decrease in support of all the political parties. In 2006, the Party won 30.23 percent of the national vote, while in 2008 that total fell to 26.24 percent. This represented a decline of 3.99 percentage points. Moreover, this drop resulted in a large decline in seat totals for the party, as it won 27 fewer seats than in 2006.

2008 Election Results (National Popular Support by Party)

Party	2008 Election	2006 Election	Vote Change
Conservative Party	37.63%	36.27%	+ 1.36%
Liberal Party	26.24%	30.23%	- 3.99%
Bloc Québécois	9.97%	10.48%	- 0.51%
New Democratic Party	18.20%	17.48%	+ 0.72%
Green Party	06.80%	04.50%	+ 2.3%

Key Factors in the 2008 Federal Election

The Economy

One of the most important factors in the 2008 election was the economy ― in particular, the highly publicized weakening of the international finance industry and the sharp drop in the stock market that coincided with the election period. While the economy was already a key concern for Canadians prior to the election, these specific events brought the parties’ economic policies even more to the forefront of the election debate.

The Conservative Party attempted to calm fears by suggesting that Canada’s economic fundamentals were strong and that the federal government’s best approach was to lower taxes and exercise fiscal restraint. The Conservatives also attempted to undercut support for the other parties by arguing they would damage the economy further by raising taxes. The other parties, by contrast, attacked the Conservatives for failing to have a real plan of action for addressing the new economic conditions. They also argued that this “do-nothing” approach indicated weak leadership and a failure to understand the gravity of the economic situation faced by Canadian families.

The drop in Liberal support may have been due in part to a concern over that party’s proposed environmental policy (known as the Green Shift) and its impact on the economy. On the other hand, the Conservatives failed to gain a majority, even though the economy was supposedly an area of strength. In the end, while the economy was a central focus of the election, the issue may not have been a singularly decisive factor for any of the political parties as Canadians cast their ballots.

Quebec and Newfoundland

Another key factor was the failure of the Conservative Party to gain any kind of traction in the provinces of Quebec or Newfoundland and Labrador. This failure is very important, considering how close the Conservatives came to forming a majority government. In fact, following the 2008 election, Gilles Duceppe (leader of the Bloc Québécois) characterized his campaign as a success insofar as the Bloc was able to deny the Conservatives a majority government.

In Quebec, the Conservatives won 10 seats, the same as they won in 2006. More importantly, the party saw its share of the vote in Quebec drop from 24.6 percent in 2006 to 21.7 percent. The Conservatives had anticipated making large gains in Quebec due, in part, to long-term trends which had the Conservatives increase their popular support in that province over several elections. The Conservative government, helmed by Stephen Harper, had also attempted to make their party more attractive to Quebec voters. In 2006, the Harper government passed legislation recognizing Quebec as a “nation within a united Canada.” The Harper government had also attempted to meet financial demands from Quebec (as well as the other provinces) by addressing the perceived federal-provincial fiscal imbalance. Nevertheless, two key events derailed the Conservatives efforts to secure greater support in Quebec in 2008: there was a backlash over Conservative handling of arts and culture policy, in which the Party became perceived as under-appreciating the arts and cultural sectors; and the party gained an image as being overly socially conservative, with changes it had proposed to dealing with young offenders.

In Newfoundland and Labrador, the Conservatives lost all three seats they had won in 2006; they also saw their portion of the vote in that province drop from 42.7 percent to 16.5 percent. The Conservatives’ weakness in Newfoundland and Labrador stems from its cancelling of the Atlantic Accord (to which the previous federal Liberal government had committed), and dealt with equalization payments to the province. In 2006, the new Harper Conservative federal government unilaterally cancelled this Accord, resulting in a provincial backlash. The Conservative government later back-tracked from its original decision and negotiated a second deal with the provincial government, however voter disdain for the Conservatives did not subside. In the 2008 campaign, voters were reminded of all this by Danny Williams, the popular premier of Newfoundland and Labrador, who actively campaigned against Stephen Harper and the Conservatives during the election with his “ABC” campaign (Anybody But the Conservatives).

Televised Leader Debates

Traditionally, the televised leader debates have minimal impact on the outcome of federal elections. The 2008 debates were projected to continue this trend, especially considering the English debate was to be held at the same time as the debate of the vice-presidential candidates in the US. Surprisingly, however, the debates had a much larger impact on the 2008 election than in previous years.

In the 2008 campaign, the debate ‘stakes’ were raised significantly, at the campaign’s outset, over the issue of whether or not Green Party leader Elizabeth May should participate. Previously, only the leaders of political parties with representation in the House of Commons had been allowed to participate in the debates. Even though the Green Party had one member in the House prior to the election call, the media consortium (which organizes the debates) had excluded the Greens. In addition, both Stephen Harper (Conservative Party leader) and Jack Layton (New Democratic Party leader) expressed the view that May should not be allowed to participate in the debate. Following public outcry over the exclusion, the broadcasting consortium reversed its decision, allowing May to participate in the debates.

While the debates did not decisively change the dynamics of the election, they did serve to have a significant impact on the campaign. Prior to both the French and English debates, the Conservatives enjoyed a large lead over the other parties in public opinion polls; at that time, the general consensus of pollsters was that the Conservative Party could win a majority government. By contrast, in the pre-debate period, the Liberals were mired at historically low levels of public support, at times near only 20 percent of popular support. Following the debates, however, the gap closed noticeably; support for the Conservatives began softening, while the Liberals enjoyed a slight boost. This may have been due to perceived weak performance by Conservative leader Stephen Harper during the debates and relatively strong performances by Liberal Party leader Stéphane Dion, NDP Party leader Jack Layton, and Green Party leader Elizabeth May (particularly, in the French debates). Also important to note is the increase in support for the Green Party. This may have been due, in part, to May’s participation in the debates, and the resulting national exposure.

The debates alone did not cause this shift in public support. Economic events, such as the collapse of major international financial institutions and weakening world stock markets, also coincided with the closing of the gap between the parties in the public opinion polls. Moreover, the Conservatives were already under public attack in Quebec over the party’s positions on the cultural arts and youth offenders. The debates, however, may have reinforced trends in voting behavior that were already ‘in play.’

Non-Factors in the 2008 Federal Election

The Environment

The environment was billed as a key issue in the 2008 election. Public opinion polls conducted prior to the election had suggested the electorate’s concern about the environment had increased significantly since the previous election in 2006. This coincided with greater public awareness about key environmental issues, such as global warming, and the rise of green politics at the federal level. The Green Party had emerged as a mainstream political party in Canadian politics, while the Liberal Party had chosen to make the environment a central plank of its election platform.

Nevertheless, it’s not clear that concern over the environment played a significant role in voting behaviour, at least not in a direct manner. The economy, instead, dominated political discourse during the election, with strong environment policy being portrayed as being in conflict with pressing economic realities. In this sense, the Conservatives may have been successful in suggesting to voters that the stronger environmental policies of their opponents, such as the Liberal Party’s Green Shift, would be detrimental to Canada’s economic stability and recovery. Further contributing to this was the inability of the Liberals to explain their Green Shift in an effective manner, so as to counter Conservative portrayals of this policy.

Military Mission in Afghanistan

Another significant non-factor in the 2008 election was the military mission in Afghanistan. Public opinion polls prior to the election had suggested that a strong majority of Canadians disapproved of Canada’s military actions in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Parliamentary Budget Officer released a report during the election in which he was critical of the government for misreporting the total cost of the military mission. Nevertheless, the Afghanistan mission was not a dominant issue in the election discourse ― nor was it likely a decisive issue in voter behaviour.

This may have been due to a number of factors. First, the Conservatives and Liberals both supported military action in Afghanistan, as well as the timeline for ending the mission. This partisan agreement effectively took the Afghanistan mission off the election table for both parties. Second, the fact that formal timeline for withdrawal exists may have reduced the significance of Afghanistan for Canadian voters. At the time of the election, the Conservative government had committed to withdrawing troops by 2011. The Afghanistan mission may have had a higher election profile if the government had left the timeline open, without a firm exit date.

Traditional Policy Issues

It is worth noting that several policy issues, which tend to be at the forefront of Canadian federal politics, did not play a significant role in this election. The first of these issues was health care. Traditionally, health care is a central plank of the parties’ election platforms, with each party highlighting how it would address deficiencies in the system (such as waiting times) and advocating reforms, be it through stronger public support of the system or greater participation by the private sector. The 2008 election discourse, however, rarely focused on the issue of health care.

Another traditional issue that was absent from the 2008 election campaign was Quebec separatism. Even in Quebec, where the Bloc Québécois tends to focus voting patterns on the Quebec separatism, the issue had very little traction. Election dynamics in Quebec, instead, seemed to be influenced by Conservative policies on the arts and young offenders. The Bloc Québécois intentionally based its campaign on these issues. Interestingly enough, its success in the 2008 election was more about the party’s ability to capitalize on anti-Conservative sentiments rather than any public support for Quebec separatism ― the party’s raison d’être.

Beyond the 2008 Federal Election

Continued Minority Government

The most direct impact of the 2008 election result is continuing minority government at the federal level. This is the third minority government elected by Canadians since 2004, marking one of the longest periods of minority government in post-Confederation history.

Duration of Minority Governments (1867-2008)

Political Party	Prime Minster	Term	Duration
Liberal	William Mackenzie King	1922-1925	1,277 days
Conservative	Stephen Harper	2006-2008	888 days
Liberal	Pierre Trudeau	1966-1968	826 days
Liberal	Lester Person	1963-1965	846 days
Liberal	Pierre Trudeau	1973-1974	490 days
Liberal	Paul Martin	2004-2005	421 days
Conservative	Arthur Meighen	1926-1926	176 days
Progressive Conservative	John Diefenbaker	1962-1963	132 days
Progressive Conservative	John Diefenbaker	1957-1958	110 days
Progressive Conservative	Joe Clark	1979-1979	66 days

(Source: Parliament of Canada, 2008)

As the Conservatives do not enjoy a clear majority in the House of Commons, they will need to rely on the other parties to pass government legislation. This may result in greater cooperation between the Conservatives and at least one other party, either in an ongoing basis or a case-by-case basis. Following the election, Conservative Party leader, and prime minister, Stephen Harper indicated a willingness to work with the other parties. Considering the large ideological differences that separate the Conservatives from the other political parties, however, it’s not clear how such a relationship might work.

One advantage for the Conservative government will be a weakened Liberal Party (see below for more). With the Liberals looking inward at their leadership and policy direction, they may not be inclined to challenge the Conservatives in the immediate future, or to consider forcing another election anytime soon. This may, in turn, allow the Conservative government to push forward with its own agenda without great concern over losing the confidence of the House.

Growing Conservative Strength in Ontario

One of the more important results of the 2008 election was the growth of Conservative support in the province of Ontario, once a fortress of Liberal power and electoral support. Since the 2000 election the conservative support in Ontario has steadily grown, translating into a greater number of seats and share of the popular vote share. By contrast, the Liberals have seen their electoral fortunes steadily decline. The 2008 election is a significant milestone, in that it saw the Conservatives take top spot ― as the preferred federal political party of choice in Ontario ― for the first time in several decades.

Liberal Party Support vs. Conservative Party Support in Ontario (2000-2008)

General Election	Liberal Party		Conservative Party
General Election	Seats	% of Vote	Seats	% of Vote
2000*	100	51.5	02	25.8
2004	75	44.7	24	31.5
2006	54	39.9	40	35.1
2008	38	33.9	51	39.2

*2000 figures for the conservatives based on the combined numbers of the Canadian Alliance Party and the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, which subsequently merged into the Conservative Party of Canada.

It is unclear, however, what this trend means for the long term. On the one hand, it may suggest a changing of the guard, in terms of the preferred political party in Ontario, away from the Liberals and towards the Conservatives. Considering the historic influence of Ontario on the overall results of Canadian federal elections, this may further suggest the entrenchment of the Conservative Party as the new party of government in Canada, at least for the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, it’s not clear that Conservative support in Ontario is stable. As the 2008 campaign clearly demonstrated, Conservative support outside Western Canada is vulnerable to sharp declines over relatively minor issues ― as evidenced by the party’s poor showing in Quebec. There, Conservative support at the beginning of the election bled away not only to the Bloc Québécois, but also to the Liberals. If Conservative support in Ontario is similarly soft, the Liberal Party may be able to recapture some of its past support under different leadership and/or with a different policy focus and platform.

Continued Liberal Weakness in Western Canada

In Western Canada, political observers have long recognized the weakness of the Liberal Party, which has been systemic since the days of the Trudeau Liberals in the 1980s. Throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium, the Liberal Party was largely able to rely on its massive support in central Canada to form governments.

Liberal Support in Western Canada (2000-2008)

General Election	British Columbia		Alberta		Saskatchewan		Manitoba
General Election	Seats	% of Vote	Seats	% of Vote	Seats	% of Vote	Seats	% of Vote
2000	5	27.7	2	20.9	2	20.7	5	32.5
2004	8	28.6	2	22.0	1	27.2	3	33.2
2006	9	27.6	0	15.3	2	22.4	3	26.0
2008	5	19.3	0	11.4	1	14.9	1	19.1

As the Liberal Party can no longer depend upon massive support in Ontario, it may have to look to growth in the west as a key element in the party’s revitalization. This, however, would be difficult; since 2000, the Liberal Party has steadily seen both its seat totals and percentage of the popular vote steadily decrease in the west (see above table). In 2000, for example, the party won 14 seats, with popular support in each of the western provinces above 20 percent. In 2008, the Liberals won only seven seats and fell below 20 percent in each province. In Alberta and Saskatchewan, support for the Liberal Party fell to lows of 11.4 and 14.9 percent respectively. It also bears noting that the Liberals have not elected a member of parliament from Alberta since 2004.

This all contrasts sharply with the extremely high numbers traditionally charted by the Conservative Party across the western provinces. Moreover, in the 2008 election, the Liberal Party trailed well behind the New Democratic Party as the second major contending party in each western province. A perfect example of this is British Columbia, where the Conservatives took over half the seats and almost half the popular vote, while the New Democratic Party was the second strongest party in the province.

Party Support in British Columbia (2008 General Election)

Party	Seats	% of Vote
Conservative Party of Canada	22	44.4
New Democratic Party of Canada	09	26.1
Liberal Party of Canada	05	19.3
Green Party of Canada	00	09.4

Growing New Democratic Party Electoral Success

While the New Democratic Party remained the fourth party in terms of seat totals, it nevertheless scored an important victory in the 2008 election. The Party significantly increased its overall seat count, winning its largest number of seats in the House of Commons since 1988. Since the 2000 election, the NDP has steadily increased both its seats in the House and its portion of the national vote.

New Democratic Party Support (2000-2008)

General Election	Seats	% of Vote
2000	13	8.5
2004	19	15.7
2006	29	17.5
2008	37	18.2

During the election, the New Democrats adopted the strategy of presenting themselves and their leader, Jack Layton, as a legitimate government alternative. This is in contrast with previous tactics adopted by the party, where New Democrats portrayed themselves as simply a social democratic voice in Parliament. It’s important to note that in the 2008 campaign the Party was able to increase its seat count even with strong growth by the Green Party of Canada ― support which likely came at the cost of traditional NDP votes.

It is, however, unclear what this trend may suggest for the long-term. While the New Democrats almost doubled their seats between 2004 and 2008 (from 19 to 37 seats), their portion of the national vote has only increased marginally during the same period (from 15.7 to 18.2 percent). This may suggest the Party has a ceiling in its electoral support and that current electoral gains have been based on dissatisfaction with the Liberal Party in its current form rather than stable, committed support for the NDP. Nevertheless, the 2008 election results are very important, considering that in 2000 the Party was on the verge of becoming an irrelevant force in national politics.

Declining Voter Turnout

Another important result of the 2008 election was the extremely low voter turnout. In the 2008 election, only 59.1 percent of eligible voters cast a ballot ― the lowest voter turnout for a federal election in Canadian history. Overall, voter turnout for federal elections in Canada has steadily declined since the late 1980s.

Voter Turnout for Federal Elections (1988-2008)

Year	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006	2008
Voter Turnout	75.3%	69.6%	67.0%	61.2%	60.5%	64.7%	59.1%

This long-term, declining rate of democratic participation has been attributed to a number of factors, including a lack of interest in the electoral process, dissatisfaction with the candidates/political parties, and a lack of confidence that one’s vote mattered.

For more information on voter turnout:

Mapleleafweb: Voter Turnout in Canada

Paul Martin Returns to Ottawa with a Minority Government

Greg Farries — Fri, 04 Jun 2004 00:00:00 -0600