Federal Politics

Leadership Politics: Bernard Lord

Royce Koop — Sat, 13 Dec 2008 19:58:26 -0700

Andrew Steele has written a strange article describing potential successors for Stephen Harper as Conservative leader should the government be defeated in January. I doubt that Harper is in any real danger even if he does lose a confidence vote - there are no formal mechanisms to remove him as leader in the short term and no other candidate has anything resembling Harper's rock-solid base of support within the party.

Unfortunately, Steele has confined himself to the Ottawa set and (unbelievably) included Jean Charest. My question: What about Bernard Lord? The former New Brunswick premier would be a fine replacement for Harper, although it's not at all clear that he wants the job.

Tactical Lessons, Part II: The Coalition

Jared Wesley — Thu, 11 Dec 2008 17:36:30 -0700

What about the coalition? What can we learn, tactically, from their performance?

Lesson 1: Never interrupt the spin cycle.

The first major mistake made by coalition forces: not giving the media enough time to frame the entire crisis in terms of Harper's hubris. Anyone who read the fiscal update knew its political purpose. Yet, instead of letting the news cycle run its course, the opposition announced its plans to form a coalition less than three hours after the fiscal update. (The fiscal update was announced at 4pm, and the coalition announced its intentions at 7pm.) Not only did "coalition talk" dominate the rest of the cycle, leaving the Tories 'off the hook' for their F.U. On top of this, the fact that the three opposition leaders were able to reach an agreement so quickly fed into the Conservatives' counterspin (it was a backroom deal, months in the offing).

Lesson 2: Check your address book.

Sending conference call coordinates to the "wrong Duncan"? Sure, Jack didn't say anything he hadn't already made crystal clear during the campaign. And yes, the Tories deserve some blame for taping and broadcasting the discussion. But the damage was already done.

Lesson 3: Mind your photo-op.

For the life of me, I cannot understand why Layton and Dion would agree to be photographed, on stage (Canadian flag or not), signing an agreement with Gilles Duceppe. For starters, if Duceppe really wasn't part of the coalition, why is he signing documents? Second, do you really need to film the Tories campaign ads for them? Someone please explain this choice to me. There had to be a reason.

Lesson 4: Buy a Sony.

Enough has been said about Dion's cell-phone-camera-quality response to Harper's national address. If you're looking to run a national campaign, buy a Sony Camcorder. (I hear the Boxing Day Sale at Best Buy is starting early.)

Lesson 5: It's all in a name.

This is a minor quibble, but I was a little miffed that the opposition didn't come up with a jazzier name for their "team" than simply "coalition." Granted, many of the really catchy terms were taken. (‘Axis' and ‘Alliance' come to mind.) But even something as simple as the "majority coalition" or "coalition of Canadians" may have helped direct the spin.

Lesson 6: Avoid the Senate.

I'm not sure who gave Elizabeth May the idea that she was in line for a Senate seat. (Perhaps it was May, herself.) Even more troubling, I'm not sure who gave her the notion to broadcast this idea. Canadians are lukewarm - at very best - when it comes to Senate appointments. And many in Western Canada are even colder to the idea. (Given their recent musings about midnight appointments, the Conservatives could use this advice, as well.)

Lesson 7: Ask permission.

I'd suggest it's a good idea to ask people - or at least inform them - before announcing their presence in an Economic Advisory Council. The media confusion surrounding the McKenna and Manley rejections was only matched by that of Mr. Romanow's wife, who suggested that her husband had never even heard that a coalition existed.

Tactical Lessons, Part I: The Conservatives

Jared Wesley — Thu, 11 Dec 2008 17:07:14 -0700

Hindsight is 20/20, and a backseat driver is always the best judge of the road. For what it's worth, here's my view of the past few weeks, as seen out the rear windshield. Part I: What lessons can we learn from the Conservatives?

Lesson 1: When you're in your best sweater-vest, don't throw mud.

Without a doubt, the Tories' first and most crucial error was issuing the "F.U." (fiscal update) to Parliament. Between them, the bans on public servant strikes and per-vote subsidies painted the opposition parties into a corner. Surely, that was the intention. One gets the sense that the Conservatives had no intention of following through with these proposals. (The quick retreat suggested prior planning.) Rather, their purpose was to make the opposition look hapless, self-interested, or both. It was a gamble, and one that tarnished the image of all parties involved. Stephen Harper's hopes of crafting a sweater vest image - attracting moderate voters and women - are all but dashed, as a result.

Lesson 2: Consider all options.

Despite Jack Layton's constant musings during the campaign, the ‘coalition option' didn't enter into the Conservatives' calculations. One wonders whether Mr. Harper would do it all over again, knowing what he does today.

Lesson 3: Don't hire "yes" men.

As suggested last night on The National, Conservative fortunes have retreated since the departure of Harper's original brain trust. Flanagan, Bosenkool, Brodie, and others were never afraid to either tell Harper "no," or to ignore some of his more ill-advised suggestions (see Lesson 1). That's the job of any good political advisor. If media reports and anecdotes are accurate, Giorno and Harper now hire "assistants" based on ‘the level of fear in their eyes.' In such a working environment, more ideas like the "F.U.," publicly-announced cuts to arts funding, and midnight Senate appointments, tend to slip through the cracks. It's ironic, then, that so many people have blamed Tom Flanagan - specifically - for the events of the last few weeks. In reality, as Tom suggested himself on television, none of this would have happened on his watch.

I invite readers to submit their own lessons. Goodness knows this episode will form the basis of textbooks and lectures for decades to come.

The Year of the Political Apology - I'm Sorry for the F.U.

Jared Wesley — Thu, 11 Dec 2008 16:35:46 -0700

On his show earlier this week, CJME Regina radio host John Gormley deemed 2008 "The Year of the Political Apology." Boy, was he right. From Eliot Spitzer's fall from grace, to Gerry Ritz's ill-humored cold-cut remark, politicians have been saying sorry for a whole slough of personal misdeeds. [I invite readers to add to this list.] Even governments have been getting into the act, as witnessed by Parliament's public apology on residential schools. A year earlier, the Canadian government apologized to Japanese Canadians for its World War II internment program. (As further proof of the government's penchant for contrition, we even called on Japan to apologize for interning women during the same conflict.) Each of these national apologies was orchestrated by the Conservatives - a fact that is somewhat puzzling. Given that most observers - including many in the Tory caucus - have admitted it was a mistake to issue the "F.U." fiscal update, it's a wonder Harper and his team haven't issued a public apology for contributing to the rancour on Parliament Hill. I guess partisanship means never having to say "I'm sorry"? What do you think?

The Liberals Land on Their Feet

Harold Jansen — Thu, 11 Dec 2008 10:58:04 -0700

I haven't had a lot of time to blog lately. It's grading time at university which leaves little time for other things. However, I'm procrastinating right now, so it's time to write something.

The big news is obviously that Michael Ignatieff has become leader of the Liberal Party, right now on an interim basis, but almost certainly on a permanent basis, however the extra-parliamentary party decides to ratify his appointment. With an election in the new year a distinct possibility, the Liberals couldn't stay with Stephane Dion. If there was any doubt of that, Dion's poor performance on the taped response to Harper's television response sealed the deal. But what could have been a lengthy and messy battle over who should be the interim leader and the process by which that leader and the permanent leader was chosen turned into a coronation when Bob Rae stepped out. Rae deserves two cheers for his move (to steal a good line from Peter Russell), because it allowed the party to move forward with their permanent leader more quickly. Rae doesn't get the third cheer, because it was pretty clear Ignatieff was going to win anyway. Still, it was a classy move that could allow the Liberals to unify and be more focused.

The cost to this, of course, is that a leadership race can lead to renewed interest in the party, an increase in membership, and the ability to build up a database of potential supporters -- both voters and financial supporters. As Tom Flanagan has argued, it was the two leadership races that Harper ran that was the start of the Conservatives' sophisticated grassroots funding machinery. These are all things that the Liberals badly need, and should be Ignatieff's first priority as leader.

There's been a lot of discussion about whether Ignatieff's ascension to the leadership means the end of the coalition. It's tougher to see this going ahead and much tougher to see it lasting under Ignatieff than under Dion or Rae. However, Ignatieff is keeping the coalition idea alive. He needs to do that to keep Harper diminished. It opens the opportunity for an alternative government.

What's key, though, is that there is an optimism among the Liberals that hasn't been there since the sponsorship scandal rocked the party. Ignatieff doesn't have any ties to that era, so he's able to move the party forward. The Liberals see better days ahead are now positioned to deal with some of the serious problems in their party. But this means that the Liberals are poised to challenge for government sooner than it looked a few months ago. This, rather than the coalition, may be what ultimately comes out of Harper's economic update of two weeks ago.

With Michael Ignatieff as Leader of the Liberal Party, is the Coalition Dead?

Greg Farries — Tue, 09 Dec 2008 09:58:03 -0700

CTVNews is reporting that Bob Rae has told his supporters in a conference call Tuesday that he will end his bid for the Liberal leadership. Considering Rae's departure means Michael Ignatieff is the sole remaining candidate for the leadership position and almost certainly the next leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, is Ignatieff going to continue with the coalition with the New Democratic Party?

Or will he use the threat of a coalition government - as the CTV article mentions - as a "weapon" against the Conservative's until he is ready to lead the Liberal Party into an election? Considering the potential problems that could rise with a coalition with the NDP (and one that would need the direct support of the Bloc), Ignatieff might just decide to "go it alone" sooner rather than later.

What do you think?

Is the Problem Coalitions in General or THIS Coalition?

Harold Jansen — Fri, 05 Dec 2008 12:55:18 -0700

Although the question of whether a coalition can take over is primarily a constitutional and parliamentary question, there's no doubt that public opinion is a factor, lurking in the background of all of these discussions. And the polls are coming in. They suggest that Canadians prefer Stephen Harper and the Conservatives to govern.

Although I think some of the media pronouncements of the death of the coalition are a bit premature, the failure to rally public opinion is a problem they have to deal with. The question that needs to be asked, though, is Canadians' problem with the idea of a coalition government itself or with this particular coalition. Although there has been some criticism of the coalition idea generally, for the most part, the problem seems to be with this coalition. Paul Wells makes the argument that had the coalition been structured differently or had circumstances been different, it might have a chance to succeed. I think he's right. The Liberals and NDP face a number of critical problems which make this a tough sell. The dependence on the sovereigntist/separatist/secessionist/treasonous/country-wrecking BQ (or whatever we're calling them today) is phenomenally bad optics. The fact that the combination of Liberal plus NDP seats does not outnumber the Tories makes this difficult to pass off. And the leadership of Stephane Dion makes this even harder. It's tough to sell him to Canadians when his own party apparently has no confidence in him. The best argument for the coalition, the fact that it has the support of the parties which got a majority of the vote in the last election is a good one, but not one that the coalition succeeded in making.

More importantly, I hope Wells is right that the right coalition can succeed. Coalition governments can and do work around the world and fit nicely into the logic of our parliamentary system (though not our electoral system, which is the topic for another post). It would open up more governmental options for the future in Canada and move us away from this cycle of repeated minorities. And it might encourage a less destructive form of politics where parties have to consider each other not only as adversaries but also as potential governing partners. As long as the BQ is around (and thanks to the rhetoric of our government this week, their future looks bright), it's going to be difficult to get a majority. This weeks events have introduced the idea of a coalition to the vocabulary of Canadian politics. I hope it hasn't poisoned it to the extent that it isn't viavle under different circumstances.

(What's so Funny 'Bout) Peace, Love and Understanding? Reconciliation and Prorogation

Harold Jansen — Thu, 04 Dec 2008 19:34:32 -0700

The more I think about the prorogation decision, the less comfortable I am with it. Essentially, it can gut the central principle of Canada's system of responsible government: that the government must have the support of a majority of the members of the House of Commons. The Conservatives are pointing out that they passed the last confidence vote, which was on the Throne Speech as justification for this, but that's pretty flimsy. They lost the confidence of the House and they know it. Only messing around with the scheduling in Parliament saved them.

But it's done. So now what? Here's what I hope will happen and what I think the country needs. Everyone needs to take a step back, take some deep breaths, and maybe add a little extra rum to the egg nog this Christmas. And somehow the parties have to develop a level of basic respect for each other and their roles in the House of Commons. When I teach my students about Parliament, I always stress that the essentially adversarial relationship in the House needs to be tempered with a level of cooperation and respect or Parliament doesn't work. That's true even during a majority government and doubly true during a minority government. Somehow the parties have to develop that again and I hope they use those seven weeks to do it.

Do I think it will happen? Probably not. There seems to be a level of personal animosity between the leaders that I do not recall ever seeing. Both sides bear some responsibility for this, but I have to say that Stephen Harper and the Conservatives bear a significant chunk of the blame. It was a petty and bitter partisan move to try to strip the annual subisdy away from the parties to begin with. It was reckless to play to the baser instincts of Canadians outside of Quebec by demonizing the Bloc Quebecois, which has actually softened its sovereigntist tone over the years. It was disgusting to see the blatant misrepresentation of Canada's constitutional principles by the government. In Harper's speeches last night and this morning, he didn't display much in the way of contrition or reaching out to the other parties other than vague references to "trust building." Many people have been calling for Harper's resignation over this whole incident and I seriously question whether Parliament will be able to work the way it should until both Harper and Dion are replaced as leaders.

Lessons Lost?: Mantioba's Coalitions

Jared Wesley — Thu, 04 Dec 2008 14:26:29 -0700

We've heard a lot about Canada's limited experience with coalition governments in the past week. Engaged citizens today are as familiar as ever with the 1917 Union Government, the 1925-26 King-Byng Affair, and the Ontario episode in 1985. One prominent example of Canadian coalition government has been lost in all of the talk, however. And there are important lessons to be learned from it.

Before dismissing this entry as parochial musings of a political historian, consider the many parallels between the careers of two party leaders: Stephen Harper and John Bracken, Manitoba's premier from 1922 to 1943. Both men earned reputations as astute political tacticians, each orchestrating the creation of a new "fusion" party (Bracken, the Liberal-Progressives, and Harper, the Conservative Party of Canada). Both men faced potentially catastrophic global crises - Bracken, the Great Depression and World War II, and Harper the most recent global recession. And both men led legislatures deeply divided along partisan lines. Yet, in terms of their responses and fortunes, the political lives of Bracken and Harper could not be more different. The former governed Manitoba for over twenty years by reaching across party lines, while the latter has staked his political future on a high-stakes game of partisan chicken.

If it is not too late, Stephen Harper may have a lot to learn from John Bracken. I am not referring to Bracken's approach to the economy (although, according to critics, both men appear to share a common allegiance to crisis capitalism). Crucially, Brackenism reflected a conscientious effort to strike a balance between: (1) change and stability; (2) left and right; and (3) partisan and pragmatic politics. All three approaches would prove useful in today's House of Commons.

On the first count, Bracken faced significant, if often muted, opposition throughout his time in office. Criticism ranged from suggestions that his party was moving too quickly, or too slowly, in addressing the challenges facing Manitoba society. Bracken responded by charting a cautious, "progressive-minded," middle course. As Bracken said of his government's "progress" after fourteen years in power, "the measures presented have been many, they have been progressive in character without being radical and they have been carefully designed to meet the best interests of the Province as a whole."

Second, Bracken also positioned himself in the centre of the Manitoba political spectrum, promoting his programme as a ‘commonsense' solution to the ills of society. While denigrating "social experiments of an unsound or costly nature," Bracken's pragmatic approach did not dismiss government enterprises out of hand. "In this connection public ownership has its place and is to be encouraged whether it can serve the community better than private or co-operative enterprise." This balanced approach reflected Bracken's search for the progressive centre. According to late historian W.L. Morton, "It was not that the principle of private enterprise had been replaced by that of socialism; neither extreme of doctrine entered into the matter. It was rather that government and people had formed a working partnership to conserve and develop the wealth of Manitoba's rugged natural heritage. That partnership was the result of the easy and intimate union of a democratic people with a government they made their own in outlook and manner..." It was a popular message, indeed.

And third, under Bracken, the Manitoba Liberal-Progressives treaded the middle ground between old-line Canadian party politics and the anti-partisanship of the early-twentieth century progressive movement. Indeed, Bracken's monopoly of the progressive centre in Manitoba was facilitated, in large part, by his flexible approach to partisanship. The premier promised a "non-partisan business administration rather than a political one" as a means of ending "party warfare" in favor of "a Government which will represent as far as possible the unprejudiced, non-partisan thought of the Province." According to Bracken, "We are not here to play politics or to represent a single class, but to get down to the serious business of giving this province an efficient government, and in that task we will welcome all the cooperation offered to us from the opposite side of the House."

Over his two decades as premier, Bracken managed to fuse his own party to the Liberals, co-opt much of the Conservative Party, and create ‘crisis coalitions' during the Depression and World War II. Such maneuvering allowed the government to cut a wide ideological path throughout much of the 1930s and 1940s, while sheltering the Liberal-Progressives from partisan attack. In this sense, the term "non-partisan" is somewhat of a misnomer. Bracken's approach was as much tactical as it was populist, reflecting his strategy to maintain power in a multi-party system during periods of intense political and economic crisis.

Through appeals like these to both elites and voters, Bracken maintained his "nonpartisan" coalition in the face of the Depression and in the midst of World War II - key turning points that had sparked changes in government throughout the rest of Canada. Moreover, according to most statistics and most historians, Manitoba emerged from each of these crises in better economic and political shape relative to their neighbors. That Bracken was able to contain not only the old-line Tory and Liberal parties, but both Social Credit and the ccf within his various coalitions - all in the same government from 1940 to 1943 - is as much a testament to the appeal of his non-partisan message, as his skills as a tactician.

As the hours pass, it has become increasingly apparent: none of the main players in the current political drama appear "built" for a crisis environment the way Bracken was. Perhaps we shouldn't be surprised. Each cut his teeth in the bygone era of hyper-partisan, majority governments in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries. What Canada needs is another John Bracken. It's not clear whether he or she will emerge before the House reconvenes in January.

Considering the Governor General's Decision to Prorogue Parliament

Harold Jansen — Thu, 04 Dec 2008 10:57:45 -0700

Like many Canadians, I was glued to the television to see what the governor general would decide in response to Stephen Harper's request to prorogue Parliament. I have a lot of sympathy for the governor-general: the Prime Minister put in her a very difficult position with this request. I'd also like to give credit to the opposition leaders. Rather than attacking the governor general and needlesly politicizing her decision, they pointed the finger at Stephen Harper. That's where the blame belongs, if there is any.

As a result, I'm hesitant to criticize Michaelle Jean's decision. I expected she would do this, but I worry about the precedent it sets for minority governments to avoid impending doom in the House of Commons. There are probably plenty of jubilant Conservatives right now, but think back to 2005 when Paul Martin faced a motion of non-confidence. What if he had simply prorogued the House? Every situation is different, obviously, but we've now just opened a new escape hatch for minority governments in the future.

On the positive side, the decision accomplishes a couple of things besides giving the Conservatives a bit more time to try to save themselves. First, it retains the GG's credibility. If she granted Harper this one, he can't complain if she decides after the House demonstrates its lack of confidence in the government (presumably in January) not to grant his request for an election and instead invites Mr. Dion to form a government. Second, it provides a test for the coalition. The Conservatives hope that the coalition will splinter either because of internal dissent, especially over Mr. Dion's leadership, or because of public pressure against. If the coalition can't maintain its cohesion over the next seven weeks, how will it do so when actually in government?

It was a historic day and I'm sure Michaelle Jean's decision will be debated for years to come.