Senate Reform

Speaker of the Senate, Noël A. Kinsella Interview

Greg Farries — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 10:53:45 -0600

Members of the Maple Leaf Web Forums where given the opportunity to propose questions to Speaker Kinsella. A few of those questions were included in this interview.

Greg Farries: The Speaker plays an important role in the day-to-day operations of the Senate. What do you consider the Speaker’s most vital role in the Senate? Moreover, what qualities do you feel make an effective Speaker?

Speaker Kinsella: Well, first and foremost, the responsibility of the speaker in any chamber in the Westminster Parliamentary system is to maintain order and to facilitate the smooth functioning of debate. The debate is the life and soul of Parliament. So, the Speaker’s responsibility is to ensure that the Standing Orders of the House are respected, that the debate proceeds in an orderly fashion and that the members’ privileges are protected. That is basically the function the Speakers play, whether in any of the legislative assembles in Canada or the two Houses of Parliament.

Greg Farries: When most people think of Parliament they often think of the lively debate that takes place during the House of Commons question period. Is it a similar situation in the Senate?

Speaker Kinsella: No, it would be quite different in the sense that the responses to the questions raised in the Senate come from two groups of Senators. On one hand, the Leader of the Government in the Senate responds to all questions raised concerning issues of the Government. The exception — and we’re in one of those exceptional circumstances today — is if there is another Senator who is a Minister of the Government. Today, it is Senator Michael Fortier, the Minister of Public Works who may be asked questions by the Honourable Senators. But the questions may only relate to his ministerial area of responsibility, namely, public works. Senator Marjory LeBreton, who is a member of the Government and represents the Government in the Senate, answering all questions (other than public works) in the name of the Government.

The other group of Senators who may be asked questions during Question Period are any of the Chairs of the Senate Standing Committees. They are required to answer questions and the Standing Orders provide for that.

Greg Farries: The public tends to be unaware of the Senate’s role. What would you stress is the most vital function of the Senate in Canadian politics?

Speaker Kinsella: Under our Canadian Westminster System of parliamentary democracy, the role of the Upper Chamber is fundamentally to be a house of review. Normally government legislation commences when it is presented by the Government in the House of Commons. The bill goes through the same legislative steps in the Senate, as it would in the House of Commons: first reading; second reading; which is then followed by a debate on the principle for a given bill and referral of that bill to a committee for detailed study and input. Witnesses may also be called by the committee to give expert testimony on the content of the given bill. Then it is reported back to the [Senate] Chamber with or without amendments before it goes on third reading. [After third reading] a message is sent back to the House of Commons stating the Senate has studied the bill and concurs with the bill unamended, or recommends given amendments. So fundamentally, the legislative role of the Senate is to serve as a house of review.

Theoretically, the function is that you get better legislation if you’ve got two Chambers looking at a legislative proposal, rather than one Chamber.

Greg Farries: Traditionally, a key role of the Senate is to provide sober second thought on legislation passed by the House of Commons. During its history, the Senate has acted on this role, stalling the passage of certain pieces of legislation, the most famous recent example being the 1988 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. As Speaker, do you believe this is an appropriate role for the Senate?

Speaker Kinsella: First off, it’s important to understand the rules of procedure, which have a history in our country of over 140 years. [These rules] provide us with a good foundation as to what the parliamentary procedural opportunities are. Sometimes delay or making sure sufficient attention is drawn to a given legislative proposal — so that the public can be aware of the proposal — is a legitimate procedure used by Senators. Senators have in the past — as they have in the other Chamber if there is criticism on a bill and they want the public to be aware of the criticism — used delay as a parliamentary tactic.

The Senate’s role is to exercise its responsibilities to review legislation to make sure Parliament really knows what it is proposing to make law. The tradition in Canada for the past 140 years is, if at the end of the day, there is a disagreement [interrupted by an election] — as there was with the Liberal majority in the Senate in the case you’ve cited, where a national federal election intervened, the Conservative government was returned and the Liberal majority remained in the Senate — the Senators recognized that the Government had been re-elected and they agreed to the free trade bill. In other words, they continued to respect the constitutional convention, which states that at the end of the day, the Senate yields to the will of the House of Commons. Why? Because the House of Commons members are directly elected by the people of Canada.

Greg Farries: Another key role of the Senate has been to investigate social and political issues facing the country. This role often overlaps with public inquiries, the most recent example being investigations in the future of public health care in Canada, which were undertaken by both the Senate and a Royal Commission. What advantages are there to having the Senate investigate public issues, as opposed to holding a full-blown public inquiry?

Speaker Kinsella: The record certainly demonstrates that public policy inquires or studies that the various Senate committees undertake are, in fact, first-class pieces of work. The example you have given, the Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology did do a study from a policy development point-of-view of the health system in Canada. And that study was occurring while there was a Royal Commission underway on the same topic. At the end of the day, the Senate Committee report was adopted by the Senate; it ended up being the foundation upon which the Government of Canada went forward in improving the public health care system. Obviously, there was some overlap [with the Royal Commission’s report on Health Care], but there were some differences. The Government found that the Senate study was a more appropriate way, and it wanted to base its policies on what the Senators came up with.

That is not surprising when considering on that particular committee, as we find on other committees, the honourable members who sat on that committee were extraordinarily gifted men and women. For example, the chair of that committee was former Senator Michael Kirby, who has had years of experience in public policy: he was Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council. The Vice-Chairman of the committee was Doctor Wilbert Keon, one of Canada’s pre-eminent cardiology surgeons, a former director of the Ottawa Heart Institute. There were a number of other members of that committee that were highly qualified. This is the advantage of having Senators who come from vast professional backgrounds and experience.

When one looks at the composition of the Senate, it’s very impressive to see some of the skill sets that are present, skill sets that are then brought to bear on these policy studies undertaken by the Senate.

Greg Farries: Do you agree with limiting the terms Senators may serve? [This question was submitted by forum member Capricorn.]

Speaker Kinsella: Let me add to that question in this way: my analysis of the Canadian system of governance proceeds from the standpoint of how well has the practice of freedom been in Canada. If you look over the past 140 years, freedom has had, in my opinion, a fairly grand success in Canada. Yes, along that way there have been some bumps and unfortunate things, and perhaps not always a smooth road. I think, for example, of the incidents like Komagata Maru, the internment of Japanese Canadians, the Chinese head tax, and others incidents like these. By and large, looking at Canada today, I cannot find any other country around the world where freedom, democracy and democratic values are as rich as they are in Canada. I say to my students, if you can find that place, let me know where it is.

Therefore, I come to the conclusion that there has got to be a few things right about the Canadian system of governance, based upon our experience of freedom during the past 140 years. Now, with that backdrop, can our institutions, all of our institutions, be improved? As you know, Parliament, under our Constitution, is composed of three constituent elements: the Crown, the House of Commons, and the Senate. Can each of these institutions be improved? No doubt. Any organization can be improved. But I do believe that the fundamental model of these three constituent elements of Parliament is valuable, and that there are lots of things right about it. To answer your specific question of the bill [on limiting terms introduced by the Government] that is in Parliament, that bill — and looking at the issue of terms — speaks to one of the three big questions about reform. The first is accountability. The second issue is the selection process: as we all know, on July 1, 1867 Canada came into existence with this particular model of governance. On July 2, 1867 the debate on Senate reform began and has been going on for the past 140 years. Very often the focus has been on the selection process.
We also have a proposed constitutional resolution brought forward by Senator Murray and Senator Austin dealing with the issue of representation; in particular, what is perceived as the under-representation of British Columbia and Western Canada. That is the third big question around Senate reform.

What pleases me is that for the first time in our history we have three big questions on the order paper for debate in Parliament. We have had, on term limits, witnesses appearing before the committee examining the issue of term limits and a fair amount of debate. We’ve never had that before, and the present Parliament is certainly engaged in this issue.

Greg Farries: In terms of Senate reform, with all these different proposals floating around, in your opinion, what reforms could be implemented to improve the effectiveness of the Senate?

Speaker Kinsella: I think the Senate is very effective as a second chamber on an operational basis. I think, as all institutions, it could be improved if we are able to come up with a model for improving the selection process and term process, as well as dealing with regional representation issue. If one reflects upon the representation side of things — the representational model that is used for selecting members of the House of Commons — how brilliant and wise the Fathers of Confederation were back in 1867. In the House of Commons today, there are 308 members and from the province of Ontario alone, there are some 106 members; one third of the members of the House of Commons come from one province alone. That means a third of the political power is concentrated in one province. The wisdom of Fathers of Confederation was to use the Upper Chamber as a balance to the House of Commons.

The three Maritime provinces were created as a division, and were given 24 senators. Upper Canada and Lower Canada each had 24, so that you had some degree of equality. In today’s terms, the inequality that many of people perceive is that Western Canada, that is, west of the Ontario border, was created as one division and only given 24 senators. That principal of balance and fettering the awesome power of the House of Commons — which centres power in one province — brings the wisdom of having representation in the Senate as a counter balance. Indeed Confederation would never have occurred (in the opinion of some authors) had the Senate not been part of the system proposed.

Greg Farries: Do you think there are any reforms that would ensure that Senators not only represent the geographic diversity of Canada, but also the cultural and ethnical diversity?

Speaker Kinsella: That’s a very interesting question. In some parts of the world where they have bicameral systems, they make a special effort to have a percentage of members coming from different ethnic or national groupings. I see that working in some countries, and I’ve seen it not work so well in other countries. In some countries that started off with a bicameral system where the selection process was the same in each chamber, they ran into the difficulty of their parliaments becoming paralyzed because the lower and the upper house made the same claim to electoral legitimacy. In some incidences they abolished one of the two houses and then ended up with a unicameral system. I think all of this is about the history and local experience of a country and its peoples. As I said, that is why I believe that we have to be very, very prudent and understand what the real test is. In my opinion, the real test of the effectiveness of governance is how well does freedom prevail in that particular country.

Greg Farries: Is it possible to enact these types of Senate reforms within the existing framework, or do we need to crack open the Constitution?

Speaker Kinsella: I believe there is an opportunity here. That is why I am very supportive of the current Prime Minister and I’ve congratulated him on being the first Prime Minister to at least get those three big questions on the order papers of Parliament. Which model, at the end of the day, would be accepted, and which model would be achieved through an amendment to the Parliament of Canada Act as opposed to an amendment to the constitution? That is a technical issue.
The issue of the Senator-selection process in the Government’s bill is a very interesting one. It is very respectful of the current constitution; it is advisory, so that the purgatives of the Prime Minster remain. I like the indirect election model for the Upper House, whereby the Prime Minister would nominate a person for a province where there is a vacancy, and it would be tested by the legislature of that particular province.

Greg Farries: What is the reception of the other Senators to these proposals?

Speaker Kinsella: I think every Senator you speak with will engage in a good discussion on Senate reform. Some of them have done a fair amount of writing and reading in the area. I think all Senators have a strong opinion on this subject.

Greg Farries: I think you might agree there are some misconceptions about the Senate. The general public may not have a keen understanding of the Senate or what exactly it accomplishes; hence they may respond that it needs to be reformed or perhaps abolished. However, what you’re saying in this interview is that it is effective. What can the Senate do to improve the public’s perception of the Senate?

Speaker Kinsella: As Canadians, we are bombarded with what we learn about governance from our neighbours to the South and their particular system. And because the terminology is similar, many people would be of the view that the House of Representatives is similar to the House of Commons and that the US Senate is the same as the Canadian Senate. But that is a congressional system, which is radically different from our parliamentary system. There would be very few students, even at the universities in Canada, who would understand this distinction. We need to take the time to first understand our system of governance and, from my point of view, see what we’ve achieved with this system. [We should also] recognize that any modifications we make to the Senate should mean that the burden of proof is on those proposing the modifications and the practice of freedom will be enjoyed as much or more under the modified system.

Greg Farries: Do you think the Senate will be reformed in your lifetime or perhaps during your tenure as Speaker? [This question was submitted by forum member, August1991.]

Speaker Kinsella Yes, I am very hopeful that we are going to be successful in bringing about some positive modifications not only to the Senate but also the House of Commons. No doubt at some point in time Canadians will be reflecting upon what modifications are meaningful in terms of a third element of Parliament, the Crown.

Greg Farries: That’s great to hear, I certainly hope that this interview helps people understand the Senate a bit more.

Speaker Kinsella: Thanks you very much for calling,

Greg Farries: Thanks and goodbye.

Interview with Senate Speaker, Noël A. Kinsella, Please Submit Your Questions!

Greg Farries — Wed, 13 Feb 2008 10:45:07 -0700

I am scheduled to do an interview with Senator Noël A. Kinsella, Speaker of the Canadian Senate. I'm providing visitors (and forum members) the opportunity to submit potential questions to Senator Kinsella.

This interview will touch on several subjects, including questions relating to the Canadian Senate, and some of the proposals to reform the Senate. Your questions can be emailed directly to me, or you can post the questions in this weblog thread or this forum thread.

Your questions can be submitted until Friday, February 15th, after which I will select three (or more) interesting questions and include them in the batch asked to Senator Kinsella. The interview will appear in the Interviews section of Mapleleafweb.

Any off-topic or disrespectful postings or questions will be deleted.

The Canadian Senate: Role, Powers & Operation

Jay Makarenko — Fri, 01 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0600

Canada’s Parliament consists of two legislative houses: the House of Commons and the Senate. While the House generally garners the majority of public and media attention, little is often known about the role and operation of its Senatorial counterpart. This article provides an introduction to the roles, powers, and operation of the Canadian Senate. Specific discussions include what the Senate is and what it does; the differences between the Senate and the House of Commons; the composition of the Senate; processes officers and committees of the Senate; as well as a comparison of the Canadian Senate to other Upper Houses in other countries.

Role of the Senate in Parliament

What is the Senate? What does it do?

Senate Powers in Theory & Practice

Differences between the Senate & the House

Composition of the Canadian Senate

Rules Governing the Appointment of Senators

Operation of the Canadian Senate

Senate Processes, Officers & Committees

A Look at Senate Chambers Around the World

How does Canada’s Senate Compare with other Countries?

Sources & Links to Further Information

List of Article Sources & Links for more on the Senate

Credits: This article was initially written by Rhonda Lauret Parkinson. It has since been altered and updated by Jay Makarenko.

Role of the Senate in Parliament

What is the Senate? What does it do?

Canada’s Bicameral Parliament

Canada has a bicameral parliamentary system, meaning that there are two legislative bodies or chambers. The first of these is the House of Commons, which is made up of elected officials called Members of Parliament (or MPs). The second legislative body is called the Senate, which is constituted by appointed members called Senators.

For more information on Canada’s Parliament:

Mapleleafweb: Canada’s Parliamentary Government

Chamber of Sober Second Thought

The Senate, in concert with the House of Commons, plays an important role in the operation of Canada’s government. In theory, any piece of government legislation must be approved by both the House of Commons and the Senate (as well as the Canadian Monarch) for it to become official law. This, however, raises the question: why does Canada have two legislative bodies to review and approve government legislation?

The ideal of democracy was cautiously accepted in the 1860s when the Canadian colonies negotiated Confederation. The primary worry was that the democratic participation of "regular citizens" in government would be detrimental to good government and policy making. As such, the Fathers of Confederation decided to provide an appointed body, the Senate, which would exercise “sober second thought” in the legislative process. The Senate was to comprise economic and social elites that would act as a check on the interests and policies of the “commoners” or “lower classes,” who were believed to dominate the democratically elected House of Commons. It is important to note, however, that this idea of an “elitist check” on the House no longer carries weight in contemporary Canadian politics. That said, the Senate continues to act as second legislative review on government legislation and action.

Routine Revising Chamber

Another role of the Senate, not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, is to act as a non-ideological, routine revising chamber that picks up flaws in legislation that have avoided notice during a bill’s passage through the House of Commons. Accordingly, the Senate might highlight confusing ideas or language in legislation, or raise questions about potential loopholes that may reduce the effectiveness of a particular law.

Regional Representation

The Senate was also envisioned as a vehicle for regional representation at the federal level of government. During the negotiations for Confederation, both Quebec and the Maritime colonies were concerned the interests of Ontario would dominate the elected House of Commons. (Ontario had the majority of Canada’s population and, thus, the largest share of seats in the House.) In order to provide balance, the three regions at the time (Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes) were subsequently allocated an equal number of seats in the Senate. This role of regional representation was maintained in 1915, when the West was designated as a senatorial region and given equal representation in the Senate.

Investigative Chamber

The Senate often undertakes another type of work, but which again is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution; namely, the investigation of social and political issues facing the country. In this context, the Senate acts in a manner similar to a Royal Commission or Public Inquiry, and will engage in detailed studies of complex or controversial issues. Over the years, issues investigated by the Senate have included poverty, aging, unemployment, the mass media, science policy, land use, national defence, Canadian-American relations, constitutional affairs, the decriminalization of marijuana, and the health care system.

Senatorial Powers in Theory & Practice

Differences between the Senate & the House of Commons

Legislative Powers of the Senate in Theory

In terms of its legislative powers, the Senate is theoretically equal to the House of Commons. Under Canada’s written Constitution, any piece of government legislation must be approved by both the House of Commons and the Senate (as well as the Canadian Monarch) for it to become official law. This provides the Senate with veto power over Parliamentary legislation, and allows it to reject, offer amendments, or delay any bills with which a majority of its members disagree.

There are some small qualifications. The Senate is not permitted to introduce bills that impose taxes or appropriate public funds. This power is reserved solely for the House of Commons, although the Senate may reject or amend ‘money bills’ that are introduced in and passed by the House. The Senate is also not permitted to delay constitutional amendments passed by the House of Commons for more than 180 days. This restriction on the power of the Senate was introduced in 1982 with the patriation of the Constitution, and allows the House to pass the constitutional amendment again, bypassing Senate approval after the 180-day period has expired.

Legislative Powers of the Senate in Practice

While the Senate is theoretically equal to the House of Commons, in practice the House is the dominant legislative body in Canada’s Parliament. This is due, in large part, to the so-called ‘undemocratic’ nature of the Senate. Whereas the House of Commons is made up of elected Members of Parliament that are democratically responsible to their constituents, the Senate consists of appointed Senators that are effectively responsible to no one. Over the years, this has led to the development of an unwritten constitutional practice that the Senate veto or delay legislation passed by the House of Commons only in rare and exceptional cases.

For more information on unwritten constitutional practices or conventions:

Mapleleafweb: Canada’s Parliamentary System – Basic Principles of Canada’s Parliament

While the Senate generally does not interfere in the work of the House of Commons, there are some notable exceptions. During the 1980s, for example, the Liberal-dominated Senate was consistently at odds with the Progressive Conservative-dominated House of Commons. Between 1984 and 1993, the Senate attempted to delay or amend several important pieces of House legislation. The Senate also tried to alter federal legislation pertaining to the constitutional amendments associated with the Meech Lake Accord, but was finally overridden by the House following the 180-day period (referenced earlier). One of the most famous conflicts between the two legislative houses occurred in mid-1988, when the Senate delayed passage of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (or “FTA”). Following the 1988 general election, however, and the return of the Progressive Conservatives to government (the PCs had campaigned in favour of the FTA), the Senate bowed to public sentiment and passed the trade agreement.

Senate & the Government

Under Canada’s system of responsible government, the federal government (or more precisely, the Prime Minister and Cabinet) is responsible to the elected House of Commons. If the government were to lose the support of the House, then the Prime Minister and Cabinet would resign and a general election would customarily be held. The Senate, however, does not enjoy the same power over the government. There is no written or unwritten requirement that the Prime Minister and Cabinet must resign if they lose the support of the Senate.

For more information on responsible government in Canada:

Mapleleafweb: Canada’s Parliamentary Government – Practice of Responsible Government

Moreover, government members, such as the Prime Minister and Cabinet, are usually drawn from the pool of members elected to the House of Commons. Only in rare cases will a Prime Minister ask a Senator to sit in his or her Cabinet, such as when a particular Senator has special qualifications desired by the government, or when the governing political party is seeking broad representation in the Cabinet and does not have enough members in the House from a particular region or ethnic group.

For more information on the composition of the federal Cabinet:

Mapleleafweb: The Prime Minister & Cabinet – Cabinet Rules & Practices

Composition of the Canadian Senate

Rules Governing the Appointment of Senators

Qualifications for Becoming a Senator

Canada’s written Constitution provides several requirements for becoming a Senator. Appointees must be 30 years of age or older, a resident of the province (or territory) for which they are appointed, and a natural born or naturalized subject of the Queen. Reflecting the tradition that the Senate consists of members of the economic elite, Senators must also own property in the province they represent. This requirement has, however, become irrelevant, as the property requirement is set at $4,000, meaning that most persons today are eligible for appointment to the Senate.

Initially, Senators were appointed for life. In 1965, however, Parliament passed legislation requiring Senators to retire at age 75. In addition to age, a Senator may be removed if s/he fails to attend two consecutive sessions of Parliament, declares bankruptcy, is convicted for treason or a felony, or ceases to reside or own property in the province s/he represents.

For a list of current Senators and their biographies:

Parliament of Canada: Members of the Senate

Regional Representation in the Senate

The basic principle governing the allocation of Senate seats is equal regional representation. The Senate is divided into four main regional areas: Ontario, Quebec, the Maritimes, and the Western Provinces, each with 24 seats. In the case of the Maritimes and Western Provinces, Senate seats are further divided among the provinces comprising those regions. In the Maritimes, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia have 10 Senate seats, while Prince Edward Island has four seats. In Western Canada, British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba each have six seats. In addition to the four main regions, Newfoundland & Labrador, and the Territories also enjoy Senate representation. Newfoundland & Labrador has six Senate seats, while the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, and Nunavut each hold one seat.

Senate as an Appointed Legislative Body

Under Canada’s written Constitution, the Senate is conceived as an unelected legislative body. This means that Senators are simply appointed to their offices instead of being elected by citizens. Moreover, it is the Governor General of Canada, on the advice of Cabinet, who holds the constitutional power to make Senate appointments. Over time, however, unwritten constitutional conventions have developed which effectively give the Prime Minister and Cabinet absolute control over the selection of Senators. While the Governor General today still officially approves appointees, in practice s/he simply accepts whomever the Prime Minister and Cabinet selects.

In making Senate appointments, the Prime Minister has complete discretion (beyond the limited qualifications provided for in the written Constitution outlined above). There is no requirement, for example, that the Prime Minister select a Senator that is acceptable to the governments or residents of the provinces they are meant to represent. Instead, Prime Ministers usually use Senate appointments as a form of political patronage, selecting persons who have been friends and allies of the Prime Minister and/or the governing political party.

It is important to note, however, that while the Senate operates as an appointed body chosen by Prime Ministers, there are no legal barriers to making Senate appointments more democratic or regionally responsive. The Prime Minister, for example, could use his/her discretionary powers to appoint Senators that have been recommended by provincial governments. The Prime Minister could also hold elections for Senate seats and simply recommend the winner of an election to the Governor General for appointment. This, however, has only occurred once in the history of the Senate, when in 1990 then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney appointed Stan Waters to the Senate for Alberta. Waters had won a Senate nominee election held by the Alberta provincial government in 1989.

Appointing Additional Senators

Normally, the Prime Minister appoints a Senator to fill an existing vacancy. Under certain conditions, however, s/he can appoint additional Senators. Section 26 of The Constitution Act, 1867, states that four or eight additional Senators, equally representing Canada’s four regions, may be appointed “If at any Time on the Recommendation of the Governor General the Queen thinks fit…”

Prior to 1982, the reference to the Queen forced the Canadian Prime Minister to obtain official permission from Britain to appoint additional Senators. Following patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982, however, consent from Britain was no longer required.

Operation of the Canadian Senate

Senate Processes, Officers & Committees

The Legislative Process

Senate voting operates on the principle of majority rule. For a bill or motion to be approved by the Senate it must receive majority support, with each Senator having only one vote. In the case of a tie, the bill or motion is considered defeated. Votes in the Senate occur when Senators themselves introduce bills or motions, when legislation passed by the House of Commons arrives at the Senate, or when the government (the Prime Minister and Cabinet) introduces a bill directly to the Senate for a vote.

As with the House of Commons, a bill must follow several steps before the Senate officially passes or rejects it. These include:

Introduction: The process begins when a bill is introduced in the Senate.
First Reading: The bill is “read” for the first time, without debate, and printed.
Second Reading: The principle of the bill is debated. It is then voted on and the bill is sent to a Senate committee.
Committee Stage: A committee hears witnesses, examines the bill clause by clause, and submits a report recommending the bill be accepted as is, or with amendments, or that it not proceed any further.
Report Stage: Additional amendments to the bill may be moved, debated and voted on.
Third Reading: The bill is debated a final time and voted on.
Message: Once passed, the bill is either sent to the House of Commons for approval (in the cases of bills introduced first in the Senate), or sent to the Governor General for Royal Assent (in the case of bills that were previously approved by the House).
Royal Assent: The Governor General, or a deputy, gives the bill Royal Assent, meaning that the legislation officially becomes law.

(Source for stages of the legislative process: “Parliament of Canada – Democracy in Action.” Parliament of Canada. 2005, 31 July 2006 <http://parl11.parl.gc.ca/Publications/Democracy-e.asp>)

Senior Officers in the Senate

The Senate has two senior officers: the Government House Leader and the Speaker of the Senate. The House Leader is appointed by the Prime Minister and sits in the Cabinet. His/her role is to speak, in the Cabinet, on behalf of members of the Senate, and to be the voice of the Cabinet in the Senate. His/her responsibilities also include steering government legislation through the Senate, and representing the Cabinet during the Senate Question Period, when Senators are given an opportunity to raise questions and concerns regarding the actions of Cabinet Ministers (the Prime Minister and Cabinet Minister themselves answer criticisms during the daily Question Period in the House of Commons).

The Speaker of the Senate enjoys a role that is similar to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and is vested with the responsibility of overseeing the day-to-day administration of the Senate, as well as business in the Chamber. This includes managing Senate debates and votes, enforcing Senate etiquette, and administering Senate employees and budgets. Like the Government House Leader in the Senate, the Prime Minister also appoints the Speaker of the Senate. In contrast, the Speaker of the House of Commons is elected by Members of Parliament.

Senatorial Committees

As in the House of Commons, the Senate has many different committees to review government legislation, scrutinize government departments and agencies, and study broad societal issues. The largest Senate committee is the Committee of the Whole, which includes all Senators. This committee operates under slightly different rules than a regular sitting of the Senate, and is convened for special debates on government legislation, to hear testimony, or to review nominees to be Officers of Parliament.

The Senate also has several Standing Committees, which are responsible for specialized areas of public policy, such as government finances, Aboriginal Issues, fisheries and oceans, and foreign affairs. These standing committees will review government legislation, departments, and agencies that are within these specialized policy areas. In so doing, they may hold hearings, collect evidence, and question members of the government or the public service, and then report their findings to the Senate body.

The Senate will also form special committees to review particular issues or events of interest. These are known as Ad Hoc Committees and typically exist for limited periods of time. Finally, the Senate may also form Joint Committees with the House of Commons, some of which are standing committees (such as the Standing Joint Committee on the Scrutiny of Regulations), while others are special joint ad hoc committees to review a particular issue or event of interest to both legislative chambers.

For more information on Senate rules and procedures:

Parliament of Canada: Rules of the Senate of Canada

A Look at Senate Chambers Around the World

How does Canada’s Senate Compare with other Countries?

The United States of America Senate

The Legislative Branch in the US government consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Senate’s main features are as follows:

Representation based on constituent units;
Equal representation (each state has two Senators);
Selection based on popular election (originally, US Senators were appointed);
Fixed terms lasting six years, with one-third of the Senate elected every two years; and
Virtually equal powers to the House of Representatives.

The switch from appointment by state legislature to direct election is a primary reason the US Senate remains powerful. Another interesting feature is that, in the United States, the Vice-President is also President of the Senate. The Senate President’s most important role is casting the deciding vote in the event of a tie.

For more information on the United States Senate:

Official Website of the United States Senate

The Australian Senate

In 1901, the Australian Commonwealth merged six former British colonies to form a federation. Australia took Canada’s experience into account when considering how to merge Parliamentary institutions with a federal system of government. The Australian Senate’s main features are as follows:

Equal representation, whereby each state has 12 Senators, and the two mainland territories have two Senators each;
Selection based on election by proportional representation;
Fixed terms of six years, with one-half of the Senators re-elected every three years; and
Powers nearly equal to the lower House of Representatives. The Senate can review, amend, or reject government legislation, including money bills. The Senate can also introduce legislation other than a money bill, but most bills are introduced in the Lower House.

On paper, the Canadian Senate’s powers are virtually equal to those found in the Australian model. The main differences, however, lie in the form of representation, the method of selecting Senators, and their length of tenure. These key differences give Australian Senators legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

The Australian Senate’s strong role relative to the House of Representatives is illustrated by a constitutional provision for breaking deadlock between the two chambers, a provision that involves the dissolution of Parliament and, subsequently, the conduct of a joint sitting involving both chambers. In contrast, in Canada the only mechanism for breaking deadlock between the House of Commons and the Senate is a rarely used constitutional provision allowing the Prime Minister to appoint extra Senators.

For more information on the Australian Senate:

Official Website of the Senate of Australia

The United Kingdom: House of Lords

Like Canada, Britain has two legislative bodies, a Lower Chamber (the House of Commons) and an Upper Chamber (the House of Lords), with the majority of power residing in the House of Commons.

Among the main features of the House of Lords:

Representation based primarily on a combination of hereditary ties (“Hereditary Peers”) and government appointments (government appointees are known as “Life Peers”).
It functions in both a legislative and judiciary capacity. The House of Lords consider legislation passed by the House of Commons, in addition to serving as final arbiters for certain civil and criminal cases.
Legislative powers are limited to a 12-month ‘suspensive’ veto. After this time the House of Commons can resubmit the bill for Royal Assent. The suspensive veto does not extend to money bills.
Other roles, including making inquiries into public issues.

For more information on the British House of Lords:

Official Website of the United Kingdom House of Lords

Sources & Links to Further Information

List of Article Sources & Links for more on the Senate

Sources Used for this Article

Book & Periodical Sources:

Dyck, Rand. “Parliament.” Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches, Third Edition. Scarborough: Nelson Thomson Learning, 2000. Pages 569-578.
Jackson, Robert, and Jackson, Doreen. “Legislative Politics.” Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions, Behaviour and Public Policy, Sixth Edition. Toronto: Pearson Publication Canada Inc, 2006. Pages 334-341.

Electronic Sources:

“Parliament of Canada – Democracy in Action.” Parliament of Canada. 2005, 31 July 2006 <http://parl11.parl.gc.ca/Publications/Democracy-e.asp>

Links to Further Information

Mapleleafweb Links:

Canadian Government Links:

International Government/Senate Links:

Research Links:

Senate Reform in Canada

Jay Makarenko — Sun, 01 Oct 2006 00:00:00 -0600

Canada has a long and diverse history of Senate reform proposals, dating back to 1874, when the House of Commons heard, and rejected, a proposal to allow each province to select its own Senators. This article provides an overview and analysis of this history of Senate reform. It focuses strictly on the period between 1970 and 2007, and describes and compares individual reform proposals, as well as general trends during this period.

Giving the Provinces a Greater Voice in the Senate

Senate reform proposals in the 1970s

Democratic Legitimacy & the Triple-E Senate

Senate reform proposals in the 1980s

Meech Lake, Charlottetown & Senate Reform

Senate reform proposals in the 1990s

Non-constitutional Change & Senate Reform

2006 Conservative Senate reform proposal

Concluding Observations: Trends in Senate Reform Proposals

Shifts in approaches to Senate reform

Sources & Links for Further Information

Article sources & links for more information on this topic

Giving the Provinces a Greater Voice in the Senate

Senate reform proposals in the 1970s

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Canadian political system faced several significant regional pressures. Quebecers, for example, were beginning to develop a new sense of cultural identity and a desire for greater control over governance and public policy. At the same time, in Western Canada, there existed longstanding concerns that federal institutions were primarily oriented towards the interests of Quebec and Ontario, and, as such, were unresponsive to the unique needs and interests of Western Canadians.

These regional pressures brought with them provincial calls for changes in federal-provincial relations, and for a greater role for the provinces within Canada’s federal system. Regarding the Senate specifically, provincial concerns stemmed from the perception that the Upper House was not providing adequate regional/provincial representation in the federal legislative process. This, in turn, led to several reform proposals that sought to give the provinces a greater voice in the Senate.

Federal Proposal: House of the Federation

In 1978, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's government tabled a broad constitutional reform package with the aim of modernizing the nation’s constitutional framework (this package was officially referred to as the “Constitutional Amendment Bill” or Bill C-60). Included in the Bill was a proposal to transform the Senate into a new upper legislature called the “House of the Federation.” With this new Upper House, the federal government sought to promote the expression and discussion of regional interests in the federal legislative process, while continuing to protect the supremacy of the House of Commons in Canada’s Parliamentary system.

Highlights of the federal government’s proposal were as follows:

Selection of Members: Federal and provincial governments would both have been entitled to select members of the new Upper House, with the federal government appointing one-half of the members, and individual provinces appointing the remainder. Under this approach, Senators would have been selected by legislatures, and not directly elected by citizens. The House of Commons would have selected federal members, while individual provincial legislatures would have selected their provincial representatives.

Regional/Provincial Representation: Representation in the new House would have continued to be based on the four traditional Senate regions: Ontario, Quebec, Western Canada, and Atlantic Canada (the Maritimes-plus-Newfoundland). To some extent seat distribution, however, would have been reorganized to create greater provincial equality. Ontario and Quebec would remain at 24 seats each, while the number of seats in the Atlantic region would have been increased from 30 to 32 (with Newfoundland receiving both of the new seats). The Western Canada region would have been allocated 12 more seats (for a new total of 36), with British Columbia and Alberta receiving four more seats each, and Saskatchewan and Manitoba getting two more seats apiece. Each territory would continue to have only one seat in the new House.

Suspensive Veto for Ordinary Legislation: The new Upper House would have had only a “suspensive” veto, in which it could only delay the passage of federal legislation. If, for example, the new Upper House were to reject legislation that was previously passed by the House of Commons, the federal government would have the option, after 60 days, to bypass the Upper House altogether, and to present the legislation to the Governor General directly for immediate Royal Assent.

Other House Powers: The new Upper House would have had an absolute veto, in regard to legislation involving “special linguistic significance,” requiring a double majority of English-speaking and French-speaking members for approval. Approval of the new House would have also been required for senior government appointments (such as appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, Crown Corporations, and key regulatory bodies). The government of the day, however, would not have been required to command the confidence of the House of the Federation to remain in power (as is the case with the House of Commons). The House of the Federation would also not be permitted to introduce money bills — legislation that explicitly involves the collection or disbursement of public funds.

(Source: Government of Canada, Constitutional Reform: House of the Federation, 1978)

Council-Type Senate Reform Proposals

In addition to the federal government’s House of the Federation, several other proposals for Senate reform were advanced during this period, many of which supported a council-type legislature modelled after the Bundesrat, the West German upper legislature. The earliest and clearest example of such a council-type proposal was the Government of British Columbia’s “Council of the Provinces,” first introduced in 1976. Other examples include Senate reform initiatives put forth by the Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation (1978), the Quebec Wing of the Liberal Party of Canada (1978), the Constitutional Committee of the Canadian Bar Association (1978), the Canada West Foundation (1978), the Pepin-Roberts Task Force on Canadian Unity (1979), and the Government of Alberta (1982).

No attempt will be made here to discuss the details of each of these council-type initiatives individually. Instead, attention will be drawn to a few common and distinguishing features:

Function of the Upper House: Each of these council-type proposals would have given the new House the responsibility of providing provincial government oversight of federal legislation concerning regional interests.

Selecting Members: Membership in the new House would have consisted of instructed provincial delegates (in most cases, provincial cabinet ministers), whom would have been appointed by, and served at the pleasure of, their respective provincial governments (or, more precisely, their premiers and provincial cabinets).

Role of Members: Members in the new House would have not directly represented geographic constituencies (such as local districts or their provinces at large), but their respective provincial governments. Moreover, members would not vote as individuals in the new House, but as part of a provincial delegation empowered to cast only a single bloc vote. Such a vote would directly reflect the desires of the particular provincial government each delegation served.

It is also important to note that some of these council-type proposals advocated greater legislative powers for the Upper House than those proposed under the House of the Federation model. The Government of British Columbia’s Council of the Provinces, for example, would have given the new House an absolute veto over federal legislation that affected provincial jurisdictions. The federal government’s proposal, in contrast, would have only provided for a suspensive veto in the majority of cases, which could be bypassed by the House of Commons after a certain period of time.

Conclusions on Senate Reform in the 1970s

While the 1970s saw heightened attention to Senate reform, and a swath of reform proposals, no significant changes were made to the Senate during this period. This was due, in part, to a lack of consensus between the federal government and the provinces over the precise nature of reform. Moreover, Senate reform generally took a backseat to other ‘high priority’ constitutional issues, such as Quebec’s place in Canada, the development of a charter of rights, the institution of a new constitutional amending formula, and federal-provincial conflict over control of natural resources.

Nevertheless, it is important to note the general themes of Senate reform proposals expressed during this period. These reform proposals tended to focus strictly on the issue of regional grievances with federal-provincial relations and calls for greater provincial control over public policy and governance. Moreover, these proposals sought to redress this issue by giving the provinces greater voice in the Senate, and, in turn, in the federal legislative process. It is also important to underscore, however, that these Senate reform proposals differed very substantially in their specifics.

Democratic Legitimacy & the Triple-E Senate

Senate reform proposals in the 1980s

Beginning in the early 1980s, the debate on Senate reform shifted to include several new issues, in particular, democratic legitimacy and provincial equality. The first of these issues centred on the unelected nature of the Senate and the length of terms for Senators, who could serve until the age of 75. The argument advanced was that these specific elements undermined the legitimacy of the Senate in a society that valued political institutions that are accountable to citizens through democratic processes.

The second issue, provincial equality, focused on the provincial distribution of seats in the Senate, and whether this representation reflected the true status of individual provinces in the Canadian federation. This issue was particularly resonant in Western Canada, where it was often argued the Western provinces were unfairly underrepresented in the Senate, while Ontario and Quebec were overrepresented.

‘Triple-E’ Proposals: An Equal, Elected & Effective Senate

During the 1980s, a new approach to Senate reform, commonly referred to as the “Triple-E Senate,” began to receive public and scholarly attention. This approach to reform supports a Senate that is:

Equal: A reformed Senate should have greater equality in provincial representation, with a more equal distribution of Senate seats among provinces.

Elected: The Senate should be more democratic with members directly elected by citizens, rather than being appointed by the federal government.

Effective: The Senate should have effective legislative powers, which it could use to play a greater role in the federal legislative process.

In sum, a reformed Senate would be an equal, elected, and effective upper legislature; hence, the term “Triple-E Senate.” This approach to Senate reform was endorsed by several groups during the 1980s, in particular, the Canada West Foundation (1981) and the Alberta Select Special Committee on Upper House Reform (1985). The 1985 recommendations of the Alberta Select Special Committee also became the official position of the Government of Alberta (a position it re-endorsed in 2003).

Alberta’s Proposed Triple-E Senate

What precisely does a Triple-E Senate entail? This section provides highlights of one version of such an approach, the Alberta Select Special Committee’s 1985 proposal:

Selection of Members: Under this proposal, Senators would be directly elected through a system of plurality voting in multiple-member, province-wide constituencies. Under this system, each province would have a certain number of Senate seats. During senatorial elections, voters would select representatives from a list of candidates, and have as many votes as there were seats to be filled. The candidates with the largest number of votes would win (for example, if 10 seats needed to be filled, then the 10 candidates with the most votes would win a seat). Additionally, Senate terms would be fixed to provincial election cycles; senatorial elections for that province would be held at the same time as provincial elections. For more information on plurality voting in multiple-member constituencies: PR Library: Plurality/Majority Systems

Provincial Representation: The Alberta Select Committee advocated complete equality between provinces in the new Senate. Under this approach, each province would have received six Senate seats, with the Territories receiving two seats apiece.

Legislative Powers: In regard to ordinary legislation, constitutional amendments, and money or taxation bills, the Alberta Select Special Committee recommended giving the Senate a suspensive veto (90 days for money bills, 120 days for other types of legislation), meaning the House of Commons could override the Senate after these time periods. The new Senate would also have the power to ratify non-military international treaties. The Senate, however, would not be a “confidence” body (meaning the government would not have to maintain the support of a majority of Senators in order to stay in power), and would not have the power to initiate taxation or money bills.

(Source: Jack Stilborn, Senate Reform Proposals in Comparative Perspective, 1992)

Conclusions on Senate Reform in the 1980s

While the notion of the Triple-E Senate received heightened attention in the 1980s, no changes actually occurred during this period. This was due, in part, to constitutional fatigue stemming from the extensive negotiations that led to the modernization of the Constitution in 1982. Moreover, the notion of a Triple-E Senate received little support from the Liberal federal government in the early 1980s (although, the subsequent Progressive Conservative government was much more open to the idea).

Again, it is important to highlight some important themes in this period of Senate reform proposals. Most importantly, the Triple-E movement involved very different concerns than those of the 1970s. Whereas the House of Federation and Council-type models focused simply on giving the provinces a greater voice in the Upper House, the Triple-E movement emphasized the need to bring democratic legitimacy to the Senate, in addition to creating greater equality in provincial representation. The objective of the Triple-E proposals, then, was not simply to alter federal-provincial relations, but to alter the relationship between citizens and government, as well as between the provinces (inter-provincial relations).

Meech Lake, Charlottetown & Senate Reform

Senate reform proposals in the 1990s

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the federal government, helmed by Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, reopened the issue of constitutional reform in an effort to bring the province of Quebec into the constitutional fold (Quebec had officially rejected the constitutional changes of the early 1980s). This effort involved two rounds of constitutional negotiation, resulting in two failed agreements: the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord. While both of these accords focused primarily on Quebec’s place in Canada, they also included proposals for reforming the Senate.

Meech Lake Accord & Senate Reform

Negotiation of the Meech Lake Accord took place in the late 1980s, involving closed-door talks between the Prime Minister and provincial and territorial leaders. As far as Senate reform, the Meech Lake Accord would have maintained the federal government’s right to appoint Senators. It would, however, have secured greater provincial involvement by requiring the federal government choose a Senator from a list of nominees provided by the provincial and territorial governments. When appointing a Senator for Nova Scotia, for example, the Prime Minister would select from a list of nominees supplied by the Government of Nova Scotia.

These Senate reforms were never formally implemented, as the Meech Lake Accord failed to obtain the required consent of all provincial legislatures. Prime Minister Mulroney did, however, use his discretionary powers to appoint Stan Waters to the Senate in 1990. The Government of Alberta had recommended Waters following a province-wide senatorial election.

Subsequent Senate appointments, however, have reverted back to traditional practice, with the Prime Minister selecting appointees without any substantive provincial input. The Government of Alberta has continued to hold provincial elections for senatorial nominees, but the federal government has ignored the results of these elections when appointing Senators to represent Alberta.

Senate Reform in the Charlottetown Accord

The second attempt to bring Quebec into the constitutional fold, referred to as the Charlottetown Accord, took place in the early 1990s, and involved broad consultation between government leaders, interest groups, and the general public. Highlights of the Senate reform proposals advanced under the Charlottetown Accord are as follows:

Selection of Members: The Accord would have enabled provinces to choose between two methods of selecting Senators: a) direct elections by residents of the provinces, or b) appointment by provincial/territorial legislatures. In regard to the direct election method, the Accord did not specify the sort of electoral system that provinces would use to elect Senators.

Provincial Representation: The Accord would have also provided for provincial equality in the distribution of Senate seats, with each province receiving six seats each. The Territories would have been allocated one seat apiece.

Suspensive Veto for Ordinary Legislation: The new Senate would have enjoyed a suspensive veto over ordinary legislation. If used, this veto would then have triggered a joint sitting of the Senate and the House of Commons, with the vote outcome determined by a simple majority of both legislatures. The new Senate would also have had a suspensive veto over revenue and expenditure legislation (money bills), which the House of Commons (alone) could override after 30 days.

Other House Powers: The Accord would have provided the new Senate with an absolute veto (no House of Commons override) in cases of legislation affecting French language and culture. This veto would have required a double majority of both French-speaking and English-speaking members. Also, the Senate would have enjoyed the power to ratify federal appointments. It would not, however, have been a “confidence” body (meaning that the government would not have been required to maintain the support of a majority of Senators to stay in power). It also would not have had the power to initiate taxation or money bills.

(Source: Jack Stilborn, Senate Reform Proposals in Comparative Perspective, 1992)

For more information on the Charlottetown Accord:

Conclusions on Senate Reform in the 1990s

While the issue of Senate reform was formally reopened in the 1990s, no changes were made to the Senate during this period. This was due to the fact that both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords failed to receive the support needed for amending the Constitution. The Meech Lake Accord failed to gain approval from the Manitoba and Newfoundland provincial legislatures (the Accord required the consent of all provincial legislatures, because it would have changed the Constitution’s amending formula, and modified the Supreme Court of Canada). The Charlottetown Accord was rejected in national and provincial referenda; a majority of Canadians in a majority of provinces, including a majority of Quebecers and on-reserve Aboriginals, voted against the Accord. It is important to underscore, however, that these two constitutional packages were rejected for a number of different reasons, not strictly because of their Senate reform components.

What are the major themes in this era of Senate reform proposals? The more limited Senate reform in the Meech Lake Accord reflected the 1970s concern of giving the provinces/territories a greater voice in the Upper House. Its reform proposals addressed the issue of federal government appointments, requiring the Government of Canada appoint Senators from a list of candidates provided by individual provinces.

In contrast, the more comprehensive reforms of the Charlottetown Accord centred squarely on the principles of the Triple-E Senate movement. It would have provided for the direct election of Senators by citizens (although, provinces could still appoint members if they so desired). Moreover, it would have created provincial equality in the new Upper House, with each province receiving the same number of seats. Finally, while limiting the Senate to a suspensive veto in most cases, the Accord would have made the Senate relatively effective in a number of ways. It would have, for example, provided for a joint sitting of both federal legislatures in order to override a Senate veto regarding non-money bills, provided for an absolute veto where federal legislation affected French language and culture, and given the Senate the power to approve federal appointments.

Non-constitutional Change & Senate Reform

2006 Conservative Senate reform proposal

Following the extensive and failed constitutional negotiations of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the issue of Senate reform receded from the public agenda. In 2006, however, it made a reappearance following the election of a new federal Conservative government.

Limited Terms & Non-Binding Elections

In the fall of 2006, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper put forth several limited proposals for reforming the Senate, with the aim of making the Upper House more accountable:

Limiting Terms of Senators: The Conservative government introduced legislation to limit the terms of Senators to eight years. Currently, Senators serve until the age of 75, without term limits.
Selection of Members: The Conservative government also committed to introducing legislation that would require non-binding elections for new Senators. The Prime Minister would then use his/her discretionary powers to appoint the winners of those elections to the Senate.

Pursuit of Non-Constitutional Senate Reform

In introducing these reforms, the Harper government emphasized its desire to make changes to the Senate without engaging in lengthy and potentially divisive constitutional negotiations. The Harper government has suggested that it would be able to pursue these limited Senate reforms without requiring use of the Constitution’s general amending formulas, and without entering into negotiations with the provinces.

In this regard, it is useful to note that the Canadian Constitution provides for three different methods of amendment:

Unanimous Federal/Provincial Consent: Some changes to the Constitution require unanimous consent at both the federal and provincial levels of government. These include changes to the offices of the Monarchy and Governor General, the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, and the constitutional amending formulas. For such constitutional changes to be approved, they must be consented to by the Governor General, the House of Commons, the Senate, and all provincial legislatures.

Majority Federal/Provincial Consent: Other changes to the Constitution require unanimous consent at the federal level, but only majority consent at the provincial level. They include changes pertaining to the method of electing members to the House of Commons, the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting Senators, provincial representation in the Senate, extending existing provincial borders into the territories, and the creation of new provinces. For these constitutional changes to be approved, they must be consented to by the Governor General, the House of Commons, the Senate, and at least two-thirds of the provinces representing more than 50 percent of the Canadian population.

Strictly Federal Consent: Finally, some changes to the Constitution only require unanimous consent at the federal level (provincial consent is not required). This includes changes to the executive government of Canada, the Senate, and the House of Commons (excluding those sorts of changes covered under the other two amending formulas). Such changes would only require the consent of the Governor General, the House of Commons, and the Senate.

The Harper government suggested its reforms would not require formal changes to the Constitution, or, in the worse case, would only trigger the last of these constitutional amending formulas. Hence, according to the Conservative government, there would be no need to formally change the Constitution, nor seek provincial consent, in order to implement this type of Senate reform. Several of the provinces, however have disagreed. In 2007, the governments of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland and Labrador, publicly stated that any change to the terms and selection of Senators would require provincial consent, and have requested Prime Minister Harper's government to consult with the provinces before making any changes to the Senate.

For more information on the Conservative government’s limited Senate reforms:

Conclusions on Recent Senate Reform Proposals

As of June 2007 , the Conservative government’s proposed Senate reforms had not yet been implemented. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize key themes in this set of Senate initiatives. While the scope of the reforms proposed is limited, they do reflect some of the basic principles associated with the Triple-E approach, articulated earlier in this article.

The Conservative government’s proposal seeks to make the Senate more democratically accountable by integrating direct elections into the selection process, as well as limiting the terms of Senators to eight years (as opposed to limiting terms by age, currently at 75 years).

Moreover, this set of proposals reflects a more practical issue in Senate reform – how to accomplish change within Canada’s existing constitutional and political framework. Past attempts at Senate reform were often included within broader constitutional initiatives (the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords being two examples). This made Senate reform much more complex to achieve, in the sense that they depended on federal and provincial agreement on other (often more contentious) constitutional issues, such as Quebec’s place in Canada. In contrast, the Conservative government seems to be attempting to bypass any constitutional wrangling by proposing limited reforms that would not require Constitutional amendment or, in the worst case, only require constitutional approval at the federal level (the House of Commons, the Senate, and the Governor General).

It is important to note, however, that the Conservative government can only go so far with this approach to Senate reform. If the Harper government wishes to address other principles contained in the Triple-E Senate approach, such as equality in provincial representation, such reforms would trigger the Constitution’s other amending formula. This would, in turn, require entering into negotiations with the provinces, as well as raising the possibility of opening other divisive constitutional issues.

Concluding Observations: Trends in Senate Reform Proposals

Shifts in approaches to Senate reform

The preceding sections provided an overview of Senate reform proposals between the 1970s and 2007. In examining these proposals overall, several trends are evident:

Many Proposals, But No Action

While Senate reform has received a significant level of public, academic, and government attention, very little has actually been accomplished. Reasons for this include periods of disagreement between the federal government and the provinces over the nature of Senate reform (particularly in the 1970s and 1980s), the perception that Senate reform was perhaps a lower priority relative to other constitutional issues (such as Quebec’s place in Canada); and, the attachment of Senate reform to larger constitutional packages that failed to receive government and public support.

Shifts in the Nature of Reform

Another important trend has been a shift in the nature of reform proposals. During the 1970s, reform proposals focused exclusively on giving the provinces a greater voice in the Senate (in particular, in choosing Senators). Beginning in the 1980s, however, other issues entered the debate, including democratic legitimacy and provincial equality. This is particularly clear in the Triple-E Senate movement, as well as reforms proposed under the Charlottetown Accord and by the Conservative government in 2006.

Current Period of Senate Reform

Finally, the issue of Senate reform is again receiving a high level of government and public attention. Moreover, current reform proposals seem to be focused on two primary issues: a) making the Senate more democratically legitimate, and b) finding an effective method to implement these reforms. The state of play, however, could shift again, depending on the electoral fortunes of the Conservative government.

Sources & Links for Further Information

List of article sources & links for more information on this topic

Sources Used for this Article

Book & Periodical Sources:

Government of Canada. Constitutional Reform: House of the Federation. Ottawa: 1978.
Smith, David. “The Improvement of the Senate by Non-constitutional Means.” Protecting Canadian Democracy: The Senate You Never Know. Ed. Serge Joyal. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003.

Electronic Sources

Stilborn, J. “Senate Reform Proposals in Comparative Perspective.” Library of Parliament. November 1992. 18 September 2006.
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp316-e.htm#pA.%20Appointed>
“Reforming the Senate.” CBC News. 30 May 2006. 18 September 2006.
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdngovernment/reforming-senate.html>
“Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982” Department of Justice Canada. 18 September 2006.
<http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/const/index.html>